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All of these approaches run into serious normative and empirical challenges. In principle,
(4) is best, but in practice, (2) is sometimes both the most that can be expected and the
least that can be demanded.
Many people favor labeling GM food on the ground that it poses serious risks to
human health and the environment, but with certain qualifications, the prevailing
scientific judgment is that it does no such thing. In the face of that judgment, some
people respond that even in the absence of evidence of harm, people have “a right to
know” about the contents of what they are eating. A simple response to this argument
is that the benefits of such labels might well be lower than the costs. Consumers would
obtain no health benefits from labels. To the extent that they would be willing to pay
for them, the reason (for many though not all) is likely to be erroneous beliefs about
health risks, and erroneous beliefs are not a sufficient justification for mandatory labels.
Moreover, GMO labels might well lead people to think that the relevant foods are
harmful and thus affirmatively mislead them.
Some people contend that GMOs pose risks to the environment (including
biodiversity), to intelligible moral commitments, or to nonquantifiable values. Other
people think that the key issue involves the need to take precautions in the face of
scientific uncertainty: because there is a non-zero risk that GM food will cause
irreversible and catastrophic harm, it is appropriate to be precautionary, through
labels or through more severe restrictions. The force of this response depends on the
science: If there is a small or uncertain risk of serious harm, precautions may indeed
be justified. If the risk is essentially zero, as many scientists have concluded, then
precautions are difficult to defend. The discussion, though focused on GM foods, has
implications for disclosure policies in general, which often raise difficult questions
about hard-to-quantify benefits, the proper use of cost–benefit balancing in the face
of uncertainty, and the appropriate role of precautionary thinking.
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INTRODUCTION
When should government mandate labels? When would mandatory labels
have desirable consequences for social welfare? How can those consequences
be measured? When would labels do more good than harm?
Under Executive Order 12866, binding on federal executive agencies,
some kind of market failure is ordinarily required to justify regulation,
including mandatory labels (either a standard, neoclassical market failure or
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a behavioral market failure).1 And even in the presence of a market failure,
Executive Order 12866 allows regulation, including mandatory labels, to be
imposed only if the benefits justify the costs2—an issue that presents unusual
challenges in light of the immense and pervasive difficulty of quantifying
both the benefits and the costs of labels.3
My principal goal here is to attempt to show how agencies can make
progress in surmounting that difficulty, and thus to offer a guide suitable for
use in many contexts, including (for example) calorie labels, energy efficiency
labels, fuel economy labels, graphic warnings, and much more. Sometimes
agencies can quantify both benefits and costs, or at least significant subsets of
them, either by using endpoints (economic savings or health benefits) or by
measuring private willingness-to-pay for labels. Sometimes they can point to
human dignity, equity, or distributional concerns.4 Sometimes they can
engage in “breakeven analysis.” As we will see, private willingness-to-pay is
the best approach in theory, but measuring it raises serious empirical and
conceptual challenges.
To anchor the discussion, I focus in particular on mandatory labels for
food that contains genetically modified organisms (GMOs), because the topic
has become significant in light of recent legislation,5 and because it raises a
number of general puzzles from which broader lessons can be drawn. In
Europe, and increasingly in the United States, there is considerable public
concern about GMOs and about food that contains them (GM food).6 As a
1 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 86-91
(2012) (directing federal agencies to “promulgate only such regulations as . . . are made necessary by
compelling public need, such as material failures of private markets”).
2 See id. § 1(b)(6) (requiring agencies to “adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs”).
3 See infra Section I.B.
4 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § (1)(a) (noting that the benefits to be considered “includ[e] . . .
distributive impacts; and equity”).
5 National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, Pub. L. No. 114-216, 130 Stat. 834 (2016)
(to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1639, 1639 to 1639c). Note that the requirement allows considerable
flexibility for the regulated class, and the flexibility should significantly reduce compliance costs:
food producers can comply with a symbol or with text, but also with a barcode that consumers can
scan to obtain information on ingredients. See id. § 293 (allowing food manufacturers the choice of
using either “text, symbol, or electronic or digital link”).
6 See, e.g., Ben Popken, Obama Signs Controversial GMO Food Label Law, NBCNEWS (Aug. 1,
2016, 9:51 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/obama-signs-controversial-gmo-food
-label-law-n620796 [https://perma.cc/C6PS-VZ3C] (reporting that advocates of the GMO labeling
law believe “consumers want to know exactly what’s in their food”). For a discussion on movements
in Congress, see Dan Flynn, Just Label It Takes a Victory Lap After Losing; Opts to Move On, FOOD
SAFETY NEWS (July 10, 2016), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2016/07/128725/#.V4I0pc5i5FJ [https://
perma.cc/MZ4B-HRMU], which reports on the development of the GMO labeling bill. For a discussion
of various related issues, see Margaret Rosso Grossman, European Community Legislation for Traceability
and Labeling of Genetically Modified Crops, Food, and Feed, in LABELING GENETICALLY MODIFIED
FOOD: THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 32 (Paul Weirich ed., 2007) [hereinafter
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matter of science, the principal claims are that GM food poses, or might pose,
public health risks, and that GMOs endanger, or might endanger, the
environment.7 (As we shall see, there are other claims as well.) In response to
these claims, the most modest proposal is that GM food should be labeled as
such, so that consumers can know what they are buying.8 In its simplest and
most intuitive form, the argument is that people have a right to know the
ingredients of their food, at least when they fear that those ingredients pose
risks to health or the environment.
In 2016, Congress embraced that argument, enacting legislation to require
labeling of GM food.9 The new legislation directs the Secretary of Agriculture
to promulgate implementing regulations within two years.10 Under existing
Executive Orders, those regulations will have to be accompanied by some
kind of formal cost–benefit analysis.11
The seemingly modest arguments in favor of mandatory labels for GM
food raise fundamental questions about product labeling in general. For GM
food in particular, a market failure is not simple to demonstrate, and it is even
more challenging to show that the benefits of labels justify the costs. The first
reason is that GM foods do not pose health risks at all,12 and the standard (though
hardly uncontested) reading of the science appears to be that the environmental
risks are somewhere between nonexistent and highly speculative.13 To that extent,
GM labels might confer no tangible benefits on consumers. The second reason
is that GM labels may affirmatively mislead some or many consumers by leading
them to believe, falsely, that the government thinks that GM foods do pose risks
to health or the environment.14 Because it is not easy to show that the benefits
LABELING GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD], which provides an introduction to the labeling practices
of different European countries and their justifications.
7 For an instructive discussion, see ALAN MCHUGHEN, PANDORA’S PICNIC BASKET: THE
POTENTIAL AND HAZARDS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (2000).
8 See Peter Markie, Mandatory Genetic Engineering Labels and Consumer Autonomy, in LABELING
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD, supra note 6, at 88, 88 (outlining the “autonomy” argument, which
calls for GM labels so that consumers can “make purchase decisions that are informed by their values”).
9 National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard §§ 291–96.
10 See id. § 293(a) (requiring the Secretary to establish regulations “[n]ot later than 2 years
after the date of enactment”).
11 See Exec. Order No. 13,563, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2011), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 10202 (2012) (specifying that an “agency must . . . propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that its benefits justify its costs”).
12 See Popken, supra note 6 (“A recent review of two decades of research and over 900 studies
by the National Academy of Science has not found any evidence that genetically modified organisms
pose a hazard to human health.”).
13 See infra notes 115–21 and accompanying text.
14 See Oren Bar-Gill et al., Drawing False Inferences from Mandated Disclosures 2 (Feb. 9, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2914354 [https://perma.
cc/NX9T-9LZU] (“[C]onsumers may hear “DANGER!” even though the government does not mean
to issue a “DANGER!” warning at all.”); Juanjuan Zhang, Policy and Inference: The Case of Product
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of mandatory GM labels would justify the costs, there is a strong argument that
such labels would run into serious difficulty during the process of scrutiny
undertaken by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs under
Executive Orders 12866 and 13563,15 and may potentially face legal objections.16
On welfare grounds, a tempting argument for GM labels is straightforward:
Many consumers want them, and they would be willing to pay something in
return for them. Labeling is required because people demand it; in surveys, the
overwhelming majority of Americans do favor mandatory labels.17 But this
argument runs into two objections. The first is the fact that the market is not,
on its own, producing such labels. This objection is not fatal in light of
potential market failures, behavioral and otherwise, but it does raise questions
about the basic claim. People’s responses to survey questions may not reflect
what they really care about, as reflected in their general lack of interest in the
topic at the grocery store or in restaurants.18
The second and more fundamental objection is that the consumer demand
for labels (to the extent that it exists) appears to be based largely on the
groundless belief that GM food is dangerous to human health.19 If that belief
is indeed groundless, public officials should correct it rather than cater to it.
But it is possible to ask whether that conclusion is too simple. Those who
embrace technocratic conceptions of government will have little interest in
public fear as such. But those who favor certain forms of populism might
insist that if people are fearful, officials should respond, not least because they
Labeling 5 (Sept. 23, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://jjzhang.scripts.mit.edu/docs/Zhang_2014_
GMO.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9ZB-HQYT] (finding that “emphasizing mandatory disclosure of GMOs
in food products lowers consumers’ perceived GMO safety”).
15 See supra notes 1–2 and 11. Note, however, the important qualification that the requirement
of a cost–benefit justification applies only “to the extent permitted by law.” Exec. Order No. 13,563,
§ 1, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2011), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 102-02 (2012); Exec. Order No. 12,866,
§ 1(b), 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 86-91 (2012). For that reason, the
GMO disclosure mandate might, in this context, fall in the small category of cases in which executive
agencies issue a rule, under legal compulsion, for which benefits do not justify costs. Nonetheless,
the process of review will put a good deal of pressure on the Department of Agriculture to produce
a credible explanation that the benefits justify the costs.
16 For the legal objections potentially available, in the event that the cost–benefit analysis is
arbitrary or does not demonstrate that the benefits justify costs, see infra note 45. Of course the fact
that disclosure is mandatory may turn out to make those objections irrelevant. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v.
SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (upholding a regulation by reference to statutory requirements).
17 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Do People Like Nudges?, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 177, 189 (2016) (noting
that 86% of survey “respondents were in favor of requiring companies to disclose whether the food they
sell contains” GMOs).
18 Cf. id. (reporting that respondents were “significantly less likely to favor a law requiring
restaurants to order the items on a menu from healthiest to unhealthiest”).
19 See, e.g., Health Risks, INST. FOR RESPONSIBLE TECH. (2015), http://responsibletechnology.org/gmo
-education/health-risks/ [https://perma.cc/5RXV-W22B] (“Natural genes can be deleted or permanently
turned on or off, and hundreds may change their behavior. Even the inserted gene can be damaged or
rearranged, and may create proteins that can trigger allergies or promote disease.” (internal citations omitted)).
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need to maintain public trust (and should themselves be humble about how
much the evolving science can establish).
A separate argument relies on difficult-to-quantify values and scientific
uncertainty. Perhaps GM food would threaten biodiversity; perhaps it would
have adverse distributional effects in poor nations; perhaps it endangers
widely held moral commitments. If there is a risk that GM food would cause
serious and irreversible environmental harm, it is appropriate to take
precautions,20 and labels are a modest way of doing that. Perhaps it will be
discovered, in the fullness of time, that the environmental risks (such as the
risks to biodiversity) are serious and potentially even catastrophic; perhaps
existing research cannot rule out of bounds that possibility.
The force of at least some of these concerns depends on the science. It is
clear that if the best reading of the science suggests a certain kind of
irreducible uncertainty, the argument for labeling gains force, and it can be fit
with a justification that agencies have sometimes given under the general rubric
of cost–benefit analysis. But if the risk is vanishingly small, or too speculative
to be worth taking seriously—as many scientists have concluded21—then
precautions (including labels) are difficult to justify. With reference to these
various points, I sketch the most plausible arguments that the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) might make in defending the labeling
requirement on cost–benefit grounds and suggest that some form of
“breakeven analysis” is probably the best that it can do.
Mandatory labels for GM foods raise pervasive questions about the use
of cost–benefit analysis in the context of labeling requirements. As we shall
see, that context poses distinctive challenges. The costs of labels may be higher
than is readily apparent, because they may produce subtle decreases in
consumer welfare (as, for example, when calorie labels lead people to buy goods
that are lower-calorie but less tasty, or when energy efficiency labels lead people
to purchase appliances that cost less to operate but are less attractive).
At the same time, the benefits of labels are often exceptionally difficult to
quantify and monetize, a problem that may lead agencies to make a flat
declaration that they cannot be turned into monetary equivalents at all.
Alternatively, agencies may rely on anticipated economic savings or health
gains, which may be highly speculative, and which will not, in any case, provide
anything like an adequate picture of the actual benefits.

20 See Nabil I. Al-Najjar, A Bayesian Framework for the Precautionary Principle, J. LEGAL STUD.,
June 2015, at S337 (explaining that the “precautionary principle” counsels that when faced with
possible threats “to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken” even
if the risks “are not fully established scientifically”).
21 See infra notes 115–18.
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The remainder of this Article comes in three parts. Part I, the heart of the
analysis, offers general remarks on mandatory labels, with particular reference
to the four approaches that agencies have taken to specifying the benefits of
such labels. These highly disparate approaches, which impose varying levels
of information-gathering demands on agencies, have yet to receive serious
attention in the academic literature, and Part I explores their vices and
virtues. Part II applies the analysis to GM foods, concluding that a mandatory
label is not simple to justify on cost–benefit grounds, even if agencies use
creative approaches to attempt to monetize the benefits. Part II also specifies
the best (or least bad) approach that the government might use in attempting
to show that the benefits of GM labels justify the costs.
Part III investigates uncertainty and the precautionary principle. It
emphasizes that there is room for precautions in the face of small or uncertain
risks of catastrophe but urges that on current readings of the science,
mandatory GM labels are not straightforward to defend on that ground. Part
III also discusses the claim that the precautionary principle is best understood
not in decision-theoretic terms but as a response to democratic imperatives.
I. PRODUCT LABELING IN GENERAL
A. Market Failure?
When should government require products to be labeled? Suppose that
we care about social welfare, suitably specified, and answer that labels should
be required when they would do more good than harm. It is easy to imagine
labels that are unnecessary, that are costly to impose, that are widely ignored
by consumers, that mislead consumers, or that promote the interests of
powerful private groups, not of the public as a whole. It is also easy to imagine
labels that help consumers to save money, to avoid serious risks, to protect
third parties, or to register their deepest moral commitments. Under the
standard economic approach, the initial question is whether there is a market
failure. In many cases, we expect the market to produce the necessary
information on its own.22 In other words, sellers are expected to disclose
relevant information voluntarily.23 Mandatory disclosure is needed only when
voluntary disclosure fails.
22 See Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON.
491, 502 (1981) (“The economic incentive for consumers to gather information is strong. Increases
in the efficiency of purchase decisions made are equivalent to increases in real income, and, given
the diversity of choices available in a modem economy, improved choices can lead to a large gain. In
many markets, price dispersion is substantial for identical or similar products.”).
23 See id. (noting the “substantial economic incentive” that sellers have “to disseminate information
to consumers”).
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1. Consumer Demand and Incomplete Information
When offering accounts of market failure under the requirements of
prevailing executive orders, agencies usually ask about what consumers are likely
to demand.24 A standard market failure, often invoked by agencies themselves,
involves incomplete information. Sometimes consumers lack the information that
would enable them to make (sufficiently informed) choices, and government
provides that information in order to make the market work efficiently.
It is true, of course, that consumers sometimes insist on product-related
information, and hence the market will provide it; there is no need for a
mandate. But consumers might not have the information that would put them
in the position to demand disclosure of (further) information, and it might
not be rational for them to attempt to acquire that information. Consider the
health risks posed by trans fats, which raise highly technical questions.25
Rational ignorance on the part of consumers might lead them not to acquire
information from which they would ultimately benefit. Without that
information, they might lack the knowledge that would lead them to even ask
for labels. For that reason, a government response might be appropriate.
A further problem stems from the fact that information has the
characteristics of a public good, which means that the market will not generate
enough of it.26 Acting on his or her own, each consumer might not seek
information from which all or most consumers would benefit. Mandatory labels
overcome a collective action problem.
Yet another problem arises when the point of disclosure is to protect third
parties.27 Often consumers want to know whether products are harming
people, but even if they do not, disclosure might be required in order to
reduce that harm. Suppose, for example, that disclosure of information is
designed to reduce the risks of second-hand smoke, to prevent harms to animals
(such as elephants or dolphins), to protect vulnerable groups (as with disclosure
of “conflict minerals”28), or to protect American jobs (as with “country of
origin” or “made in America” labels29). If third parties are at risk, we have a
24 See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 26-29 (1982) (explaining that
reguluation is often justified as a means to correct “errors” in the supply of information to consumers).
25 See SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM 152-55
(2013) (discussing the decision by New York City to ban trans fat in restaurants and cafeterias).
26 Beales et al., supra note 22, at 503 (“The first . . . market failure arises from the fact that
information has public good properties. The purchase, production, and use of information by consumers
generate a market-perfecting external benefit to uninformed consumers.”).
27 See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Commitments in Cost-Benefit Analysis 4 (Coase-Sandor
Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 802, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2930450 [https://perma.cc/HC2N-RALH].
28 See infra note 47.
29 See 7 U.S.C. § 1638a (2012) (requiring retailers of particular products to inform their consumers
of each product’s country of origin); Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 23 (D.C. Cir.
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standard argument for government intervention. To the extent that GM food
is thought to pose risks to the environment, a market failure seems to be
involved. It is true, of course, that the preferred response to such risks is some
kind of corrective tax, not disclosure.30 But if a tax is unavailable, for political
or other reasons, then disclosure might seem to be a reasonable second-best.
There are behavioral issues as well. If risks are not sufficiently salient, then
consumers might not demand relevant information about them, even if those
risks are not exactly trivial. In principle, disclosure could therefore increase
consumer welfare.31 Or suppose that health risks are long-term; if so, then
“present bias” might lead consumers not to demand information about
them.32 It is true that in the face of present bias, disclosure might not do much
good; present-biased consumers might not care about what they learn. But
perhaps information could be provided in a way that would reduce present
bias. For example, labels might be graphic or specifically focus people on what
might happen in the long-term.
2. Producer Behavior
Notwithstanding these points, a standard unraveling argument predicts
voluntary disclosure even if consumers do not demand it. Assume that for
whatever reason (rational or not), consumers would choose non-GM foods if
they were given the information that would enable them to do so. Specifically,
assume that consumers are willing to pay $10 for GM salmon and $20 for non-GM
salmon. Further, assume that GM salmon costs $5 to produce, whereas non-GM
salmon costs $7 to produce. Finally, assume that, initially, half the salmon on
the market is GM and half is not. Without any labeling, the consumer would
not know what kind of salmon she is buying and would, therefore, be willing to
pay $15 (= 0.5*$10 + 0.5*$20). This state of (consumer) ignorance benefits the
producers of GM salmon and harms the producers of non-GM salmon.

2014) (“But here we think several aspects of the government’s interest in country-of-origin labeling
for food combine to make the interest substantial: the context and long history of country-of-origin
disclosures to enable consumers to choose American-made products; the demonstrated consumer
interest in extending country-of-origin labeling to food products; and the individual health concerns
and market impacts that can arise in the event of a food-borne illness outbreak.”).
30 See Steven Shavell, Corrective Taxation Versus Liability as a Solution to the Problem of Harmful
Externalities, 54 J.L. & ECON. S249, S249 (2011) (“The corrective tax has long been viewed by most
economists as a, or the, theoretically preferred remedy for the problem of harmful externalities.”).
31 See Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information
Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505, 511 (2006) (arguing that when consumers have
access to more information, they are able to “make more informed choices among the available goods”).
32 See generally Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Present Bias: Lessons Learned and To Be
Learned, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 273, 274-75 (2015) (discussing the impact of present bias on economic
decisionmaking).
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But this state of ignorance is not an equilibrium. The non-GM sellers will
voluntarily add a “No GMOs” label so that they can charge $20, rather than $15 per
salmon (as long as the cost of adding such a label is less than $5 per salmon). The
GM salmon will not be labeled, but GM labeling would not be necessary—rational
consumers would infer that non-labeled salmon is GM. As Bar-Gill and Board
explain, “An implication of this result is that mandatory disclosure of productattribute information is often unnecessary.”33
In the example just given, the relevant quality dimension is binary (GMO
or non-GMO). A similar argument predicts voluntary disclosure when the
relevant quality dimension is continuous. Assume that different microwave
ovens in the market emit radiation in the range of 0–10 mW/cm2, with levels
of radiation distributed uniformly (such that, for example, the number of
microwave ovens emitting no radiation is equal to the number of ovens
emitting 1 mW/cm2 of radiation, and equal to the number of ovens emitting
2 mW/cm2 of radiation, and so on). Without any labeling, consumers would
not be able to distinguish low-radiation ovens from high-radiation ovens and
would attribute the average radiation level, 5 mW/cm2, to any oven they
consider purchasing. Producers of low-radiation ovens, with radiation levels
below 5 mW/cm2, would be harmed by this state of consumer ignorance.
These producers would voluntarily disclose their ovens’ radiation levels.
Now consumers would know the radiation levels of all ovens with levels
below 5 mW/cm2. And when considering a non-labeled oven, the consumer
would assume an average radiation level of 7.5 mW/cm2. But then producers
with radiation levels between 5–7.5 mW/cm2 will voluntarily disclose. Only
producers with radiation levels between 7.5–10 mW/cm2 will remain silent,
and so consumers would attribute an average radiation level of 8.75 mW/cm2
to a non-labeled oven. Now producers with levels between 7.5–8.75 mW/cm2
will voluntarily disclose. And so on, until complete unraveling is achieved
and all information is voluntarily disclosed.34
As a real-world example analogous to the question of GM food, consider
the example of gluten free foods. Some people (including those with celiac
disease) are allergic to food that contains gluten. At least to date, we do not
observe statutory disclosure requirements (“Warning: this product contains
gluten.”). Instead we see voluntary labels, saying (for example) that products
are “gluten free.” The FDA has issued guidance for such labels.35 On admittedly
optimistic assumptions, voluntary labels provide sufficient information.
33 Oren Bar-Gill & Oliver Board, Product-Use Information and the Limits of Voluntary Disclosure,
14 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 235, 237 (2012).
34 See id. (explaining the “unraveling dynamic [that] leads to voluntary disclosure by all firms”).
35 For a summary of gluten-free labeling from the FDA itself, see Gluten and Food Labeling, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatory
Information/Allergens/ucm367654.htm [https://perma.cc/VVP8-98YG] (last updated May 2, 2016).
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3. Markets that Do Not Unravel
This happy unraveling story, however, does not always play out. Failure
of voluntary disclosure occurs for several reasons—some neoclassical and
some behavioral. Starting with the standard, neoclassical reasons, note that
the unraveling result assumes that voluntary disclosure is truthful. But
imperfect enforcement might lead to false disclosures, which government
must correct—and once government is in the business of correction, it may
be essentially mandating a label.
In addition, voluntary disclosure might fail when there is no standardized
format or metric for disclosing information. Without standardization,
consumers might not be able to make the required distinctions,36 in which
case voluntary disclosure will be insufficient. And if the point of disclosure is
to protect third parties, the unraveling story might not work because
consumers might not care enough about third party effects to respond to the
various informational signals. True, consumer indifference would also mean
that mandatory labels would be ineffective. But it is plausible to think that
consumers care some—enough to make mandatory labels work but not enough
to promote unraveling.
Behavioral economics suggests an additional and perhaps stronger reason
for skepticism about voluntary disclosure. The unraveling result assumes that
consumers attend to and draw rational inferences from silence—from the
absence of a label. But attention is limited,37 and such inferences can be quite
difficult to draw, especially when consumers are receiving numerous signals at
the same time (as is true for food) and when there are multiple quality levels
or continuous quality dimensions. Suppose, for example, that some products
come with labels saying “low fat” or “low sugar.” Would consumers necessarily
infer that products lacking such labels are high in fat or sugar? Or would many
consumers not think much or at all about the question of fat or sugar?
A standard neoclassical argument is that in a generalization of the “lemons
equilibrium,”38 competition might occur over easily observed characteristics,
such as price, and less or not at all over less observable characteristics, such

36 For a discussion of neoclassical economic theories of consumer decisionmaking, see Beales
et al., supra note 22, at 492.
37 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, ATTENTION AND EFFORT 13-17 (1973) (discussing constraints on
consumer attention in relation to informed decision-making). See generally SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN
& ELDAR SHAFIR, SCARCITY: WHY HAVING TOO LITTLE MEANS SO MUCH (2013) (examining how
cognitive scarcity and “limited bandwidth” affect choices).
38 See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (discussing the relationship between product price and quality
and consumer demand).
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as ingredients.39 The behavioral suggestion (or exclamation point) is that in
view of the scarcity of attention, this limited kind of competition is highly
likely.40 And even if consumers pay attention to the relevant ingredient (salt,
sugar, fat), they might be unable to draw a fully rational inference from the
absence of disclosure.
For example, those who are purchasing cereal or milk might attend to a
variety of product attributes, and unless high fat or high sugar content is
brought to their attention, many of them might not consider those ingredients
at all. If many consumers would not pay attention or draw a negative inference
(or a sufficiently negative inference) from the absence of a label, voluntary
disclosure might fail. Such failure justifies the consideration of mandatory
disclosure, at least in principle. The Affordable Care Act, for example, mandates
calorie labels,41 and there is a plausible argument on their behalf based on the
considerations just sketched.42
4. “Does Not Contain” Labels vs. “Contains” Labels
There are many differences between a system in which products without
some characteristic say “Does Not Contain X” and one in which products with
some characteristic say “Contains X.” As we have seen, “Contains X” offers
far more salient information to consumers with bounded attention. In
addition, “Contains X” might offer a distinctive signal, suggesting that private
and public institutions think that something is wrong with X.43
“Does Not Contain X” might also promote a desirable form of sorting.
Suppose that ten percent of the population is troubled by X, whereas ninety
39 See Beales et al., supra note 22, at 510 (“By generalizing the concept of the ‘lemons’
equilibrium, we can show that, if price is more easily observed than quality, competition may be
skewed toward less expensive, lower-quality products.” (internal citation omitted)).
40 See Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 31, at 511 (finding that, absent consumer-education initiatives,
consumers are likely to resort to simple baseline-price comparisons when making purchasing decisions).
41 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205, 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(H)(ii)(I)(aa)
(2012) (requiring restaurants to list “the number of calories contained in the standard menu item”
on their menus).
42 The FDA’s own explanation disregarded the economic literature on unraveling and spoke
instead about how the rule might help consumers:

The final rule may also assist consumers by making the long-term health consequences
of consumer food choices more salient and by providing contextual cues of food
consumption. The behavioral economics literature suggests that distortions internal
to consumers (or internalities) due to time-inconsistent preferences, myopia or
present-biased preferences, visceral factors (e.g., hunger), or lack of self-control, can
also create the potential for policy intervention to improve consumer welfare.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA-2011-F-0172, FOOD LABELING: NUTRITION LABELING OF
STANDARD MENU ITEMS IN RESTAURANTS AND SIMILAR RETAIL FOOD ESTABLISHMENTS 11
(2014) [hereinafter CALORIE LABEL RULE IMPACT ANALYSIS].
43 See infra text accompanying notes 182–87.
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percent is not; suppose that both groups are informed and rational. If so, there
is no need for “Contains X.” Those who want to avoid X can easily do so, and
those who have no interest in avoiding X need not be troubled by the issue.
On a certain view of the facts, “Does Not Contain X” is the right approach
both to gluten-free and to GM food. People who are allergic to gluten should
know what to look for. The principal problem is that if they are inattentive,
they might become sick simply by virtue of the fact that the issue has not
been brought to their attention. (Compare labels saying “Contains peanuts”
or “Contains shellfish,” which may be especially important if consumers are
inattentive or if it is not self-evident that the relevant food contains either.)
With “Does Not Contain” labels, consumers can easily avoid GM food if that
is what they want to do. But this approach is not a solution if GM food has
harmful systemic effects or threatens to cause environmental harm (or if
relevant interest groups want to stigmatize GM food).
B. Costs and Benefits
Even if there is a market failure, the question remains: do the benefits of
labels justify the costs? If it would be expensive to comply with a labeling
requirement—say, $800 million annually—the question whether the benefits
are sufficient would be put in stark relief. We could easily imagine disclosure
requirements that do little good, perhaps because consumers pay no attention
to them.44 If so, such requirements would be unjustified on cost–benefit
grounds. Those who are skeptical of the benefits of disclosure requirements,
in general or in particular cases, are not merely making a point about public
policy. Whether or not they intend to do so, they are also making a
provocative claim about how regulatory review should occur within the
executive branch and potentially about judicial review as well. (Recall the
limited nature of attention, which raises the possibility that many disclosure
requirements could not survive scrutiny under Executive Orders 12866 and
13563, and possibly could not survive judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act.45) We could also imagine disclosure requirements from which
44 See OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW:
THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 8, 11 (2014) (contending that “disclosures are
unreadable and unread” and that “[o]ne Web site’s disclosure offered $100 to anyone noticing it; it
kept its $100”); ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF
TRANSPARENCY 16 (2007) (“Because information disclosers and users have limited time and energy,
they are likely to act on new information only if it has value to them, is compatible with the way
they make choices, and is easily comprehensible.”); George Loewenstein et al., Disclosure: Psychology
Changes Everything, 6 ANN. REV. ECON. 391, 398-99 (2014) (discussing the impact of attention
scarcity on the effectiveness of disclosures).
45 On the relevance of the APA and the possibility that a failure to offer a cost–benefit
justification can be a form of unlawful arbitrariness, see Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and
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consumers and third parties would benefit greatly.46 But assessment of costs
and benefits can produce a convincing legal challenge.
As we will see, agencies have not always responded well to the difficulty
of quantifying the costs and benefits of disclosure requirements. In fact, they
have adopted four distinctive approaches, imposing increasingly severe
information-gathering demands on agencies. It is not always easy to explain
why they choose one or another in particular cases.
The first approach—and it may be the most candid—is to confess a lack
of knowledge by acknowledging that, in light of existing information, some
costs and (especially) benefits simply cannot be quantified.47 The problem
with this approach is that it suggests that the decision to proceed is essentially
a stab in the dark.
The second approach involves “breakeven analysis,” by which agencies
describe what the benefits would have to be in order to justify the costs—and

Arbitrariness Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). See also Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v.
SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (upholding a regulation by reference to statutory requirements,
in the face of a challenge that the SEC failed to properly analyze the benefits of the rule due to a lack
of data). To the extent that a statute requires an agency to proceed whether or not the benefits justify
the costs—as does the GM labeling statute under discussion here—it is exceedingly unlikely that an
inability to offer such a justification would render a regulatory decision legally vulnerable. See id.
(“Despite the lack of data, the Commission had to promulgate a disclosure rule.”). It is possible,
however, that the choice of a particular approach to labeling, as opposed to legally permissible
alternatives, would be vulnerable if the latter has higher net benefits. And as noted, there will be
considerable attention within the executive branch as to whether the benefits justify the costs.
46 See Partha Deb & Carmen Vargas, Who Benefits from Calorie Labeling? An Analysis of Its Effects
on Body Mass 14 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21,992, 2016), http://www.nber.
org/papers/w21992 [https://perma.cc/B695-RL98] (finding that the “mandatory calorie labeling laws
implemented over the past few years in a number of states and counties appear to be having
substantial effects in terms of decreased BMI following implementation of such laws”); see also
FUNG ET AL., supra note 44, at 1-10 (discussing the virtues and power of disclosures).
47 For an important decision upholding a refusal to quantify benefits, on the ground that
quantification was not feasible, see Investment Co. Institute v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n,
720 F.3d 370, 372-75 (D.C. Cir. 2013). In the context of disclosure, the leading decision is National Ass’n
of Manufacturers v. SEC, which upheld against arbitrariness review a regulation that would require
disclosure of the use of “conflict minerals”:
An agency is not required “to measure the immeasurable,” and need not conduct a
“rigorous, quantitative economic analysis” unless the statute explicitly directs it to do
so. Here, the rule’s benefits would occur half-a-world away in the midst of an opaque
conflict about which little reliable information exists, and concern a subject about
which the Commission has no particular expertise. Even if one could estimate how
many lives are saved or rapes prevented as a direct result of the final rule, doing so
would be pointless because the costs of the rule—measured in dollars—would create
an apples-to-bricks comparison. Despite the lack of data, the Commission had to
promulgate a disclosure rule.
748 F.3d at 369 (quoting Inv. Co. Inst. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 720 F.3d at 379).
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suggest that the benefits are indeed likely to be of the requisite magnitude.48
In principle, this approach is better than a simple confession of ignorance,
and it is often the best path forward. But it involves a high degree of
guesswork, and it may be a mere conclusion, a kind of ipse dixit,
masquerading as an analytic device.49 Without a great deal of discipline, it
too may not be so different from a confession of ignorance.
The third approach is to attempt to specify outcomes in terms of (say)
economic savings or health endpoints.50 The advantage of this approach is that
it actually points to concrete benefits, and it attempts to measure and to
monetize them. But it too runs into difficulties. The first is that agencies may
lack anything like the information that would enable them to venture such a
specification. The second and more interesting is that, for reasons I will explore,
even an accurate specification will not give a complete picture of the actual
benefits, and, in crucial respects, it will almost certainly overstate them.51 In brief,
the problem is that people might experience significant losses as well as gains as
a result of the label (for example, if they switch to a product that is inferior along
certain dimensions), and an account of endpoints will ignore those losses.
The fourth approach is to identify consumers’ willingness-to-pay.52 In
principle, that approach is (mostly) the right one, because it should capture
the full universe of losses and gains from the label. At the same time, it runs
into serious and perhaps insuperable normative, conceptual, and empirical
challenges.53 As we shall see, the most obvious problem is that it is difficult
to elicit people’s informed and unbiased willingness-to-pay for labels.
1. Costs
On the cost side, some of the questions are relatively straightforward.
Regulators may well be able to learn the total cost of (for example) producing
fuel economy labels and placing them on new vehicles. The principal
48 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1369, 1387 (2014)
(“[T]he central goal of breakeven analysis is straightforward. It is to pose this question: How high
would the benefits have to be, in order for the costs to be justified?”).
49 See id. at 1392 (“When lower or upper bounds cannot be specified in any way, it might be
objected that breakeven analysis is not much more than a description or a hunch . . . .”).
50 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting
Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1302 (2004) (discussing the EPA’s process of setting standards
for fine particulate matter, which involved analysis of various health endpoints).
51 See infra subsection I.B.2.
52 See Sunstein, supra note 48, at 1375 (discussing the use of willingness-to-pay as a measure of
the benefits of a regulation).
53 See id. at 1377 (“[I]f we monetize regulatory benefits in terms of the willingness-to-pay
criterion, we might not have an adequate measure of the welfare consequences of regulations. . . . It
seems plain that the willingness-to-pay numbers should not be decisive when we are deciding
whether and how to promote distributive goals.”).
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difficulty arises when the information itself imposes costs on consumers. It is a
mistake to ignore those costs, even if they prove difficult to quantify, and even
if consumers benefit on net.54 Those costs come in several different forms.
Some of them will usually be low—but not always.
a. A Small Cognitive Tax
First, a cost is involved in reading and processing the information.55 For
each consumer, that cost is likely to be quite low, but across a large number
of purchasers, it might turn out to be significant. Information disclosure is,
in a sense, akin to a paperwork burden. To be sure, consumers are not
compelled to read and process what is disclosed. But even for those who seek
to ignore it, its very presence may operate as a kind of cognitive tax.
b. A Hedonic Tax on Those Who Do Not Change Their Behavior
Second, and more importantly, the cost may be hedonic, not cognitive.56
Suppose that smokers are given information about the adverse health effects
of smoking or that visitors to chain restaurants are given information about
the caloric contents of food. Many members of both groups will suffer a
hedonic loss. Consider, for example, smokers who cannot quit and customers
who decide to choose high-calorie foods notwithstanding the labels. In
hedonic terms, such people will lose, rather than gain, if they are miserable
or at least sadder at the time of purchase.57 To be sure, there is a serious
normative question whether regulators should count, as costs, the adverse
hedonic effect of truthful information. (Is it a cost, or a benefit, if people learn,
truthfully, that they have diabetes or cancer? Is there not a cost as well as a
benefit, even if the net effect is positive?) But if we are operating within a
welfarist framework, the hedonic loss must be treated as a cost. It might turn
out to be low, but regulators should not ignore it (as they typically do).

54 For a useful discussion in an especially controversial area, see Helen Levy et al., Tobacco
Regulation and Cost-Benefit Analysis: How Should We Value Foregone Consumer Surplus? (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22,471, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22471.pdf [https://
perma.cc/G6RD-9ZHD].
55 See James Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161, 171-80 (2013) (discussing
the costs of information acquisition and processing in the context of form contracts).
56 See John Bronsteen et al., Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603, 1608-09
(2013) (describing the field of hedonic psychology, which measures “how much any factor improves or
worsens” the human experience, and its implications for public policy).
57 See Emily Oster, Calorie Counts on Menus Won’t Change What Americans Eat, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Dec. 2, 2014, 1:08 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/calorie-counts-on-menus-wont-change-what
-americans-eat/ [https://perma.cc/MA7E-W4MX] (“If the actual impact of calorie labeling is to encourage
only a few people to eat fewer calories but to make many more people feel worse about themselves, it
seems less than obvious that it is a welfare-improving idea.”).
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c. A Hedonic Tax on Those Who Do Change Their Behavior
Even if people might be able to quit smoking or end up choosing lowercalorie items, and will hence benefit greatly on net, they will incur a cost by
seeing something that inflicts pain. In principle, that cost should also count,
even if it is greatly outweighed by benefits.58 The point, then, is not that the
hedonic cost is a trump card; if people make different choices once they are
informed, the presumption should be that they are better off. But by how
much? To answer that question, the hedonic cost must be taken into account.
For many people, a calorie label imposes a serious cost, simply because it
informs them that the delicious cheeseburger they are about to eat is also going
to make their belly bulge. (As a friend remarked to me after hearing that the
calorie labeling requirement in the Affordable Care Act would be applied to
movie theaters, “They just ruined popcorn.”)
d. A Consumer Welfare Loss
There is a fourth loss, in the form of foregone consumer surplus. Suppose
that people decide that on balance, they should have a salad rather than a
cheeseburger, on the ground that the latter has many more calories. If they
choose the salad because of the label, they are probably better off on
balance59—and in a sense, they are sadder but wiser (and healthier). They are
sadder to the extent that they enjoy their meal less. Assessment of the
magnitude of the loss poses serious conceptual and empirical challenges, but
there is no question that it exists, and that it might turn out to be a significant
fraction of the benefits. In principle, a decision to forego the hamburger
might make people only modestly better off, if the hedonic loss is almost as
high as the health gain.60
Suppose, for example, that consumers are choosing between two essentially
equivalent cars; that the more fuel-efficient one would cost $2000 less annually
to operate because of its fuel efficiency; that the less fuel-efficient one would
58 See Hunt Allcott & Cass R. Sunstein, Regulating Internalities, 34 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT.
698, 704 (2015) (laying out a “model . . . [for] how policy intervention can increase welfare, whether by
restricting choices, changing prices, or by ‘nudging’ individuals toward privately-optimal decisions”).
59 The assumption here is that people know what is the best choice for them, once they are
informed, but a behavioral bias cannot be entirely ruled out.
60 I am bracketing here the possible endogeneity of preferences. See PREFERENCE CHANGE:
APPROACHES FROM PHILOSOPHY, ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 4 (Till Grüne-Yanoff & Sven
Ove Hansson eds., 2009) (discussing the work of economists to incorporate indiviudals’ changing
preferenes into models of supply and demand). Suppose that at Time 1, people enjoy hamburgers a lot
and enjoy salads only a little. Now suppose that people switch at Time 2 because they want to eat
healthier. At Time 3, people might come to dislike hamburgers (disgusting!) and to love salad (fresh!).
In principle, preference change must be taken into account by the considered cost–benefit analysis,
though doing so presents serious challenges: it might be difficult to know the magnitude of the change
and even the sign (perhaps those who switch to salad will crave hamburgers and grow to despise salad).
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cost $500 upfront; and that because of the fuel economy label, they select the
fuel-efficient car. For each such consumer, we might be tempted to say that
the label has produced $1500 in gains. But in actual practice, the effects of a
fuel economy label will be much more complicated to assess. Some consumers
will end up purchasing cars that are more fuel-efficient but inferior along
some dimension, so that they will gain $1500 minus X, where X refers to the
desirable features of the unchosen car that they otherwise prefer. It is hard
for public officials to know whether X is, on average, $100, or $1000, or $1450.61
2. Benefits
On the benefits side, the assessment is even more challenging.62 If the
government mandates a fuel economy label, agencies should project the
economic and environmental benefits from the mandate. But to do that, they
have to know the effect of labels on behavior. In principle, a randomized controlled
trial would be valuable and perhaps necessary for that purpose. If one group
sees a particular label and a similar group sees a different label (or no label),
regulators should be able to specify the effect of the label on purchasing

61 This claim does not depend on the objection that a fleet-wide fuel-efficiency requirement will
impose costs in the form of a less attractive fleet (with, for example, less powerful vehicles). See Ted
Gayer & W. Kip Viscusi, Overriding Consumer Preferences with Energy Regulations 16 (Mercatus Ctr.,
George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 12-21, 2012), http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Energy_
regulations_GayerViscusi_WP1221_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UHC-HWHS] (arguing against use of
bounded rationality to assess the benefits of fuel economy regulations). All that is necessary is that
consumers choose more fuel-efficient vehicles over vehicles that are better along some dimension.
62 For example, according to the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of
Transportation, speaking of new fuel economy labels,

The agencies recognize that Executive Order 13563 directs agencies “to use the best
available techniques to quantify anticipated present and future benefits as accurately
as possible.” In this context, however, quantitative information is not available, and
the agencies have therefore chosen instead to continue with a qualitative assessment
of benefits. It is difficult to develop a good baseline for the fleet using the existing
label, partly because the existing label is not designed to incorporate advanced
technology vehicles. It is even more difficult to develop a comparison for the fleet with
the new labels, because the effects of label designs on vehicle purchases are not known.
Thus, any assessment of quantitative effects of label design on vehicle sales involves a
great deal of speculation. The agencies believe that informed choice is an end in itself,
even if it is hard to quantify; the agencies also believe that the new labels will provide
significant benefits for consumers, including economic benefits, though these benefits
cannot be quantified at this time.
Revisions and Additions to Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Label, 76 Fed. Reg. 39,478, 39,517
(proposed July 6, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600; 49 C.F.R. pt. 575) [hereinafter
Fuel Economy Labels Rule]. In short, “The primary benefits associated with this rule are associated
with improved consumer decision-making resulting from improved presentation of information. At
this time, EPA and NHTSA do not have data to quantify these impacts.” Id.
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decisions. Armed with that information, they could estimate economic and
environmental consequences (at least if they could generalize from the trial).
Unfortunately, it is sometimes difficult or impossible to run randomized
controlled trials. In these circumstances, making any kind of projection of
how consumers will react to a label is exceedingly difficult. An additional
problem is that for the reasons given thus far, the projection would not give
an adequate estimate of the (net) benefits. We have seen that if people are
buying cars that are more fuel-efficient but otherwise highly undesirable,
there will be a welfare loss. For that reason, regulators might explore the issue
from another direction.63 Rather than asking about the economic savings
from the fuel-efficient car, they might ask an entirely different question: how
much would consumers be willing to pay for a fuel economy label?
Under ideal conditions, the right question for regulators to ask involves
willingness-to-pay; they should not focus on the economic benefits that
consumers might receive if (for example) they purchase more fuel-efficient
cars.64 The reason is that on optimistic assumptions, the willingness-to-pay
question ought to capture everything that matters to consumers.65 (Of course
it is true that the question will not fully capture third-party effects.)
63 See Hunt Allcott & Judd B. Kessler, The Welfare Effects of Nudges: A Case Study of Energy Use
Social Comparisons 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21,671, 2015), http://www.
nber.org/papers/w21671 [https://perma.cc/9MD3-8QX2] (noting that nudges “can affect behavior
without changing prices or choice sets”).
64 See id. at 1 (responding to policy interventions by “measur[ing] consumer welfare . . . by
willingness-to-pay”).
65 See id. at 7-8 (defining a formula to measure consumer welfare). As noted, I am assuming that
the answers to this question are not a product of an absence of relevant information or behavioral biases.
I am also bracketing some questions about the difference between subjective and objective welfare. See
MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
165-66 (2012) (noting various philosophical approaches to studying well-being, including subjective
“individual well-being” and the “‘objective list’ approach”); JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN
THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 125 (1983) (considering adaptive preferences and the interplay
between power, freedom, and welfare, underscoring “freedom and how it is related to welfare”);
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 81
(2011) (defending the capabilities approach while also discussing the “welfarist” approach, which
“ask[s] what people’s preferences would be if they had full and comprehensive information”). The
difference between subjective and objective welfare might turn out to be relevant in some health-related
contexts. See CALORIE LABEL RULE IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 42, at 62 (relying on “willingnessto-pay for nutrition information . . . to estimate welfare gain that serves as our estimate of the benefits
of the final rule”). For example, the Calorie Label Rule Impact Analysis undertook quantifying the
potential benefits of the regulation in the following way,

We begin by describing a study (Abaluck 2011) that estimates the welfare gains from
increased nutritional information provided by the Nutrition Labeling and Education
Act of 1990 (NLEA) and additional labeling (i.e. extending nutritional information
provided by the NLEA to include food away from home, fresh produce, and meats);
our primary estimate of the benefits of the final rule uses the willingness-to-pay for
nutrition information from that study to estimate welfare gain that serves as our
estimate of the benefits of the final rule (Ref. 43). Next, we provide a thorough review
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As an empirical matter, however, it is not easy to obtain a reliable answer
to that question, or anything close to it. We might simply ask people, but for
their answers to be relevant, it would be important to provide pertinent
information66—for example, about the potential benefits (purely economic
and otherwise) of labels. Providing that information is no simple endeavor,
not least because offering some numbers about those potential benefits would
be important, and any numbers might “anchor” consumers and hence bias
their answers.67 Suppose that the problem of anchoring could be overcome
and that informed consumers would be willing to pay (say) $10, on average,
for fuel economy labels. If so, we might have some sense of the benefits, at
least if behavioral biases are not distorting people’s answers. Unfortunately,
however, such biases might well produce distortions; consider present bias
and optimistic bias, which may lead to unduly low willingness-to-pay. In any
case, survey evidence is imperfectly reliable, in part because of the familiar
problems with contingent valuation studies,68 in part because of the immense
difficulty of informing consumers in a sufficiently neutral way.69
For health-related disclosures, the problem is even harder. One goal of
calorie labels, for example, is to reduce obesity, which causes an assortment of
health problems, including premature mortality.70 Regulators have established

of the literature on the potential effects of interventions similar to the final rule on
consumer behavior. We then compare the main benefit estimate with two
supplemental, illustrative examples of benefits using the literature’s average reduction
in calories consumed at restaurants due to menu labeling. These supplemental
estimates are not included in the final reported values. Last, we conduct a sensitivity
analysis and discuss the sources of uncertainty in our estimate.
Id. at 62-63.
66 This is an objection to the particular numbers produced by Allcott and Kessler, supra note
63, at 19-21, 27-29, in their valuable paper on the welfare effects of nudges. In their study, information
was not provided to participants, so the elicited responses regarding willingness-to-pay for energy
conservation notices are insufficiently informed. See id. at 9-15 (explaining the experimental design).
Nonetheless, Allcott and Kessler convincingly argue that, in principle, willingness-to-pay is the right
question, id. at 33, subject to the qualifications in supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
67 See Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic: Why the
Adjustments Are Insufficient, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 311, 311 (2006) (noting that “the starting information,
or anchor, tends to exert drag on the subsequent adjustment process, leaving final estimates too close
to the original anchor”).
68 See Jerry Hausman, Contingent Valuation: From Dubious to Hopeless, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 43,
44 (2012) (noting that “the results of [contingent valuation] surveys are unlikely to be accurate
predictors of informed opinion. Contingent valuation about specific projects does not improve the
inputs to the analysis, so it should not be included in the policy analysis”).
69 Researchers might want to inform consumers about the economic savings from a fuel-efficient
car, but that number is highly likely to serve as an anchor, biasing judgments. See supra note 67.
70 See Calorie Label Rule, 21 C.F.R. § 101.78 (2016) (discussing the relationship between diet
and cancer risk); see also CALORIE LABEL RULE IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 42, at 65 (noting that
“consumption of more calories than is necessary to maintain a healthy weight is one of the primary
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ways to turn health-endpoints into monetary equivalents. For example, a
statistical death is now valued at about nine million dollars.71 But how many
premature deaths would be prevented by calorie labels? And what would be
the effect of such labels on adverse health outcomes short of death?
To answer such questions, regulators have to undertake two tasks. First,
they must begin by making some prediction about the effect of calorie labels
on what people choose to eat.72 Second, they have to follow that prediction
by specifying the health consequences of lower levels of caloric intake.73 At
least it can be said that if they can accomplish those tasks, they will have some
sense of the benefits of the labels, once (and this is a third task) they turn the
various consequences into monetary equivalents.74 After undertaking all three
tasks, regulators will have specified endpoints—but for the reasons given, a
specification of endpoints will overstate benefits because it will not include
various cognitive and hedonic losses.

risk factors for overweight and obesity . . . . [M]any menu labeling studies provide evidence to
suggest that calorie intake will be influenced by the nutrition labeling requirements”).
71 See, e.g., Memorandum from Kathryn Thomson, Gen. Counsel & Carlos Monje, Assistant
Sec’y for Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., to Secretarial Officers & Modal Adm’rs, U.S. Dep’t of Transp.
2 (June 17, 2015), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/VSL2015_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C6RQ-4ZXR] (“On the basis of the best available evidence, this guidance identifies $9.4
million as the value of a statistical life.”); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING
THE REGULATORY STATE 85 (2014) (providing the underlying theory and a discussion of how
“agencies . . . assign monetary values to the human lives that would be saved by a proposed regulation”).
72 See id. (noting that a calorie labeling rule would have the benefit of “decreasing the consumption
of calories from standard menu items”).
73 See id. (specifying that the benefits of the rule were measured “as the direct medical costs and
total burden of lost quality adjusted life years (QALYs) that could be averted from an improved diet
. . . minus the value of lost utility from reduced or altered consumption”).
74 See CALORIE LABEL RULE IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 42, at 89 (discussing the
methodology used to assume numerical figures to the proposed benefits of the rule). For another
example, see Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628,
36,719 (proposed June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141), http://www.fda.gov/downloads
/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/RulesRegulationsGuidance/UCM339834.pdf [https://perma.cc/UY5UJJEE] [hereinafter Graphic Warnings for Cigarettes Rule], explaining,
We estimate the benefits of the final rule by comparing expected life-cycle events of
smokers with those of nonsmokers. Nonsmokers tend to live longer and develop fewer
cancers, cardiovascular, pulmonary, and other diseases, so the benefits in our analysis
include the discounted value of life-years gained, health status improvements and
medical services freed for other uses. We also include an estimate of the monetary value
of the property and lives saved as a result of the rule-induced reduction in the number
of accidental fires caused by smoking. There are other benefits, such as reductions in
nonsmokers’ morbidity and mortality associated with both passive smoking and mothers
smoking during pregnancy, that are likely generated by the final rule, but FDA has been
unable to obtain reliable data with which to quantify them. In particular, we were not
able to project future levels of exposure to secondhand smoke from historical trends, nor
predict future decreases in maternal smoking during pregnancy.
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Alternatively, we could (again) ask how much people would be willing to pay
for calorie labels.75 As before, asking that question is, in principle, preferable to
an effort to assess health-states because the answer will capture all variables that
matter to consumers.76 Also, as before, there are formidable challenges in using
surveys to elicit reliable numbers free from biases of various kinds.
In light of these challenges, regulators have two reasonable options. First,
they can work on the two relevant tracks to try to produce answers: exploring
end-points and enlisting surveys. On prominent occasions, they have tried the
former.77 Second, they can acknowledge the difficulties, confess that they
cannot surmount them, and use “breakeven analysis,” by which they ask what
the benefits would have to be, in order to justify the costs, and then do what
they can to generate a reasonable lower bound.78 Suppose, for example, that an
75 See Maria L. Loureiro et al., Do Consumers Value Nutritional Labels?, 33 EUR. REV. AGRIC.
ECON. 249, 263 (2006) (finding that “on average, consumers are willing to pay close to 11 per cent above
the initial price to obtain cookies with nutritional labelling”); see also id. at 249 (“Consistent with prior
expectations, our results also indicate a difference between the [willingness-to-pay] of individuals
suffering from diet-related health problems (estimated mean 13 per cent) and those who do not
suffer any diet-related health problems (estimated mean 9 per cent).”).
76 In the words of the FDA,

To our knowledge, Abaluck (2011) is the only study that translates the potential effect
of increasing nutrition information on consumption into estimates of welfare gains
using willingness-to-pay based on revealed preferences (Ref. 43). This study uses the
variation in nutrition information generated by Nutrition Labeling and Education Act
(NLEA) as a method to determine how changes in individuals’ beliefs about nutrient
content affect consumption decisions. The differential changes in nutrition information
across food categories, measured in units of calories per gram, allow the study to identify
a general model of food demand as a function of nutrient characteristics that accounts
for the total daily diet, prior beliefs about nutrient content, and preferences, including
willingness to substitute across food categories.
CALORIE LABEL RULE IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 42, at 64. As before, however, the willingnessto-pay criterion may run into normative objections, even from the standpoint of welfare. See generally
JOHN BRONSTEEN ET AL., HAPPINESS AND THE LAW (2015) (raising questions about willingnessto-pay in view of people’s occasional failure to know what will promote their welfare).
77 See Graphic Warnings for Cigarettes Rule, supra note 74, at 36,719 (noting the longer lifespans,
fewer cancers and diseases, as well as increased property and monetary values of non-smokers); Improve
Tracking of Workplace Injuries and Illnesses, 81 Fed. Reg. 29,624, 29,628 (proposed May 12, 2016) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1904, 1902) [hereinafter OSHA Reporting Requirement Rule] (requiring that
employees have access to OSHA logs); Fuel Economy Labels Rule, supra note 62, at 39,517 (“The agencies
believe that informed choice is an end in itself, even if it is hard to quantify; the agencies also believe that
the new labels will provide significant benefits for consumers, including economic benefits, though these
benefits cannot be quantified at this time.”); see also CALORIE LABEL RULE IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra
note 42, at 11 (“The final rule may also assist consumers by making the long-term health consequences of
consumer food choices more salient and by providing contextual cues of food consumption.”).
78 See Sunstein, supra note 48, at 1372 (“Breakeven analysis . . . is a way to engage in a form of
cost-benefit analysis (understood with suitable capaciousness) when regulators face serious
limitations in knowledge.”). The FDA ultimately chose an approach of this kind in an important
regulation involving tobacco products. For an outline and a discussion of the context of this decision,
see Levy et al., supra note 54, at 8, which explains,
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energy-efficiency label for refrigerators would cost $10 million annually and that
eight million refrigerators are sold in the United States every year. Even if the
average consumer saves only $0.50 annually as a result of the label, the cost will be
made up in just three years. Breakeven analysis can be crude, but in some cases, it
will suggest that the argument for labels is either very strong or very weak.79
3. Third Parties—and Morality
Some actual or imaginable labels are meant to protect third parties, not
consumers as such. Suppose that some or many consumers are concerned
about the use of certain minerals to finance mass atrocities, and they favor
labeling, or some kind of disclosure requirement, so that consumers can
decline to purchase products that contain such minerals.80 Or suppose that
consumers care about where goods were made, perhaps because they want to
purchase products from their own nation or perhaps because they do not want
to purchase products from nations that do not respect human rights. They
might seek “country of origin” labels for that reason.81 Or suppose that some
or many consumers care about the welfare of animals in general or certain
animals in particular; because they do, they seek labels to reflect how animals
were (mis)treated.
In some of these cases, the third-party effects are not obscure, and the real
challenge is how to quantify them. As before, it is necessary to begin by making

A more recent rule issued by the FDA in April 25, 2014 proposes deeming tobacco
products such as cigars and e-cigarettes subject to FDA regulation. Although the
regulatory impact analysis accompanying this proposed rule avoids even using the
term “consumer surplus” (referring instead to “full welfare gains”), the approach is
conceptually similar to the regulatory impact analysis accompanying the final rule for
the graphic warning labels, with foregone consumer surplus offsetting 67 to 84 percent
of the value of smokers’ private health gains. The regulatory impact analysis
accompanying the final version of this rule, released in May 2016, backed away from
this estimate. Instead, the May 2016 analysis took a “breakeven” approach that did not
quantify the rule’s benefits but instead calculated how large the benefits of the rule
would have to be to justify the costs (which are quantified), effectively sidestepping
the question of how large the consumer surplus offset should be.
79 See OSHA Reporting Requirement Rule, supra note 77, at 29,686 (stating that “if the final
rule leads to either 1.5 fewer fatalities or 0.025 percent fewer injuries per year, the rule’s benefits will
be equal to or greater than the costs. Many accident-prevention measures will have some costs, but
even if these costs are 75 percent of the benefits, the final rule will have benefits exceeding costs if
it prevented 4.8 fatalities or 0.8 percent fewer injuries per year. OSHA expects the rule’s beneficial
effects to exceed these values”).
80 See generally Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (addressing the
constitutionality of “conflict minerals” disclosures required under Dodd–Frank). For a general discussion
of conflicts minerals regulation, see Posner & Sunstein, supra note 27, at 17-19.
81 See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (noting the “the context
and long history of country-of-origin disclosures to enable consumers to choose American-made products”).
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some projections about consumer behavior. To what extent would consumers
change their purchasing habits in response? Even if that question can be
answered, it would be necessary to tie any such changes to reduced harm or
increased benefit for third parties. And even if that problem can be resolved, it
would be necessary to quantify and monetize the resulting effects. It is no
wonder that in the context of conflict minerals, the agency concluded that
quantification was not possible.82 Perhaps it should have engaged in some form
of breakeven analysis, explaining that the requirement was likely to survive
cost–benefit analysis even if its effect were modest. But perhaps it lacked the
information that would have allowed it to make that analysis plausible.83
Some disclosure requirements, including mandatory labels, are not simple
to defend within a standard cost–benefit framework, not for the reasons I
have been sketching, but because considerations of equity, distributional
effects, or human dignity are involved. When values of this kind are involved,
it is perfectly legitimate for agencies to consider them.84 Under the prevailing
executive order, it might well be sufficient for agencies simply to point to such
considerations and not to fold them into a cost–benefit analysis.85 Agencies are
authorized to give independent consideration to equity and human dignity.86 If
the statutory goal is to achieve distributional goals, by transferring resources
from some people to others, then cost–benefit balancing is not the rule of
decision, and it is not all that matters. A rule might have costs in excess of
benefits, in the sense that the losers lose more than the winners gain, but
perhaps the winners are poor or otherwise deprived, and perhaps have a
special claim to attention under the relevant law or as a matter of principle.87
82 See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d at 547 (“The Commission was ‘unable to readily
quantify’ the ‘compelling social benefits’ the rule was supposed to achieve: reducing violence and
promoting peace and stability in the Congo.” (quoting Conflict Materials, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,350
(Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b))).
83 On the importance of including consumers’ willingness-to-pay to protect their own moral
commitments, see Posner & Sunstein, supra note 27, at 16.
84 See Exec. Order 13,563, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 215, 216 (2011), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 102-02 (2012)
(“Where appropriate and permitted by law, each agency may consider (and discuss qualitatively) values
that are difficult or impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive
impacts.”). I am bracketing some theoretical issues here. See generally LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN
SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2006), which explores economic and moral arguments
and concludes that welfare is the appropriate criteria for evaluating legal rules.
85 See Exec. Order 13,563, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 215 (directing agencies to “propose or adopt a regulation
only upon a reasoned determination that its benefits justify its costs (recognizing that some benefits
and costs are difficult to quantify)”).
86 See supra note 84.
87 On the complexities here, see W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 843, 853 (2000),
which states, “Market outcomes that generate the same risk levels as would benefit-cost analysis will
differ in an important way in that those bearing the risk will receive some form of compensation in
terms of higher wages or lower prices for the risk. In the situation of risk regulation coupled with a
complete lack of information regarding the risk, there will be no associated compensation.” See also
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I have suggested that if quantification of the benefits of labels is required,
the question might be: how much would (informed) consumers be willing to
pay for such labels? Within a certain framework, that question is the right
one. But it is not at all clear that the framework is the right one. If the issue
involves human dignity, equity, or distributional considerations—or any kind
of harm to third parties—why should the proper analysis depend on how
much people are willing to pay for it? It seems senseless to say that labels
motivated by distributive goals should be imposed to the extent that people
are willing to pay for them.
To say this is not to say that consequentialist considerations do not matter
at all. Insofar as harms to third parties are involved, cost–benefit analysis can
be used, acknowledging the empirical problems sketched above. Insofar as the
issue involves equity or dignity, breakeven analysis might be useful.88 To the
extent that distributive goals are involved, a key question is whether such goals
would, in fact, be promoted by labels or disclosure. That question would seem
relevant to the “conflict minerals” problem.89 Some kind of means–ends analysis,
explaining how the means are connected to the ends, would seem indispensable
to an evaluation of labels that are designed to promote distributive goals (or for
that matter equity or human dignity). Agencies should be expected to undertake
that analysis—or to explain why they cannot.
4. Risk–Risk Tradeoffs: A Brisk Note
Some labels might reduce risks but also simultaneously create risks. Suppose,
for example, that consumers are concerned about Omicron Z (a hypothetical
ingredient) and the government responds with a mandatory label. Suppose
too that if consumers shift from products with Omicron Z, they will purchase
products that contain higher risks. If so, labels will increase risks on balance.
As we shall see, the problem is not hypothetical: products that are GMO-free
create risks of their own.
II. GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS
I now turn to the question of mandatory labels for GM foods. As we shall
see, all of the points discussed thus far—and especially the question of valuing
benefits—must be taken into account by the USDA when it produces a
regulatory impact analysis to accompany implementing regulations. I offer
SUNSTEIN, supra note 71, at 127-30 (noting that society may want to promote a goal that achieves
certain goals, even when the “losers” lose more than the “winners” win).
88 For an explanation with examples, see Sunstein, supra note 48, at 1387-89, which offers a
number of illustrative examples of breakeven analysis.
89 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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two general conclusions. The first is that it will not be easy for the USDA to
show that the benefits of the mandate justify the costs. The second is that, of
the USDA’s various options, the best (or least bad) is probably to use breakeven
analysis, accompanied by an account of consumers’ desire to be informed or by
reference to the remaining uncertainties about the environmental risks of GM
foods. In view of the highly technical nature of some of the underlying
questions, and the existence of reasonable disputes among specialists, my goal
is less to offer final conclusions about the cost–benefit analysis for GMO labels
than to outline the considerations that must be taken into account by those
who must produce that analysis.
A. A Little Science
1. Definition and Pervasiveness
The World Health Organization defines GMOs as “organisms . . . in
which the genetic material (DNA) has been altered in a way that does not
occur naturally.”90 According to a common understanding, a GMO is “one
that has been deliberately created to contain a piece of ‘foreign’ DNA, usually
a full-length ‘foreign’ gene incorporated in its genome.”91 As a result of the
underlying technology, sometimes called “recombinant DNA technology” or
“genetic engineering,” certain individual genes are transferred into one
organism from another.92 The magnitude of the benefits of GM foods is
disputed, but they can potentially grow faster, taste better, resist diseases, have
a lower reliance on pesticides, cost less to produce, and prove more nutritious.93
In the United States, GM food has become pervasive. According to the
UDSA, adoption of GM “crop varieties by U.S. farmers has reached about
90 percent of the planted acres of corn, soybeans, and cotton.”94 American

90 Food Safety: Frequently Asked Questions on Genetically Modified Foods, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/areas_work/food-technology/faq-genetically-modified-food/en/ [https://
perma.cc/JF9F-6Q6C].
91 R. Michael Roberts, Genetically Modified Organisms for Agricultural Food Production: The
Extent of the Art and the State of the Science, in LABELING GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD, supra
note 6, at 10-11.
92 See id. at 11-12 (providing a brief overview of the process of creating GMOs).
93 See Hans De Steur et al., Status and Market Potential of Transgenic Biofortified Crops, 33
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 25, 25-26 (2015) (describing “Golden Rice,” which is fortified with vitamin
A and was able to “expand the range of micronutrient strategies available to malnourished populations”);
L.L. Wolfenbarger & P.R. Phifer, The Ecological Risks and Benefits of Genetically Engineered Plants, 290 SCI.
2088, 2091 (2000) (discussing sustainability of crops that have “insecticidal properties, viral resistance, or
herbicide tolerance”).
94 JORGE FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NO. 162, GENETICALLY
ENGINEERED CROPS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2014), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications
/err162/43668_err162.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7H5-W4B4].
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“consumers eat many products derived from these crops—including cornmeal,
oils, and sugars—”even though they are generally unaware of that fact.95 In
American supermarkets, GM ingredients can be found in about 70 percent of
processed foods.96 Among them are pizza, cookies, ice cream, salad dressing,
corn syrup and chips. Consider the following figure:
Figure 1: Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops
in the United States, 1996–201697
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2. Benefits
Do GM foods have significant benefits? The answer is sharply disputed, and
I hardly mean to settle it here, but the standard arguments on behalf of GM
ingredients are that they can produce superior foods with not only more
Id.
See About Genetically Engineered Foods, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, http://www.centerforfood
safety.org/issues/311/ge-foods/about-ge-foods [https://perma.cc/H7PK-FDYL] (“It has been estimated
that upwards of 75% of processed foods on supermarket shelves – from soda to soup, crackers to
condiments – contain genetically engineered ingredients.”).
97 Recent Trends in GE Adoption, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RES. SERV., http://www.ers.usda
.gov/data-products/adoption-of-genetically-engineered-crops-in-the-us/recent-trends-in-ge-adoption.aspx
[https://perma.cc/DC3L-YU7M] (last updated Nov. 3, 2016). See also id. (“Data for each crop category
include varieties with both HT and Bt (stacked) traits. Sources: USDA, Economic Research Service
using data from Fernandez-Cornejo and McBride (2002) for the years 1966-99 and USDA, National
Agrricultural Statistics Service, June Agricultural Survey for the years 2000-16.”).
95
96
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nutritional value and greater resistance to herbicides (requiring less use of
pesticides) but also improved texture and taste.98 GM food is often engineered
for longer shelf-life, furthering the reach of shipping fresh food.99 For example,
the Innate potato has been engineered to prevent bruising and browning, as
well as to reduce the amount of the possible-carcinogen acrylamide released
when the potato is fried.100
The most famous nutritional supplementation may be Golden Rice, a
variety engineered to provide vitamin A.101 In hopes of combatting protein
malnutrition, cereals such as maize, canola, and soybean have been engineered
for greater amounts of lysine, an essential amino acid.102 Some products are
alternatives to unhealthy foods, such as the sweet protein brazzein, developed
in maize as an alternative sweetener to unhealthy sugar.103 Scientists have also
been able to reduce the harmful effects of food products, in one instance
isolating proteins that cause allergic reactions in the development of a
hypoallergenic peanut.104 In addition, GM foods have been engineered to act
98 See Peter Celec et al., Biological and Biomedical Aspects of Genetically Modified Food, 59
BIOMEDICINE & PHARMACOTHERAPY 531, 532-33 (2005) (discussing the potential for genes to
“improve[] flavor characteristics,” “increase [the] nutritional status of the foods,” and confer higher food
quality such as “shelf-life, taste, [and] nutritional value.”).
99 See id.
100 See Andrew Pollack, U.S.D.A. Approves Modified Potato. Next Up: French Fry Fans, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/business/genetically-modified-potato-from-simplotapproved-by-usda.html [https://perma.cc/46FK-TXF8] (“The potato’s DNA has been altered so that
less of a chemical called acrylamide, which is suspected of causing cancer in people, is produced
when the potato is fried. The new potato also resists bruising . . . .”).
101 See Xudong Ye et al., Engineering the Provitamin A (ß-Carotene) Biosynthetic Pathway into
(Carotenoid-Free) Rice Endosperm, 287 SCIENCE 303, 303 (2000) (discussing how genetically engineered
rice can combat vitamin A deficiency); see also Robert E. Black et al., Maternal and Child Undernutrition
and Overweight in Low-Income and Middle-Income Countries, 382 LANCET 427, 433 (2013) (finding Vitamin
A deficiencies to be responsible for 157,000 deaths of those aged 5 years and younger in 2011).
102 See Martina Newell-McGloughlin, Nutritionally Improved Agricultural Crops, 147 PLANT
PHYSIOLOGY 939, 940 tbl.I (2008), http://www.plantphysiol.org/content/147/3/939.full.pdf+htm [https://
perma.cc/4W33-FZ8V] (listing canola, maize, and soybeans as crops with high “Lys”). Newell-McGloughlin
provides an overview of techniques and products of GM nutritional supplementing—with carbohydrates,
fiber, vitamins, and more—as well as for reduced antinutrients, allergens, and toxins.
103 See Barry J. Lamphear et al., Expression of the Sweet Protein Brazzein in Maize for Production
of a New Commercial Sweetener, 3 PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY J. 103, 109 (2005) (reporting on “the use
of a maize expression system for the economical production of the intensely sweet protein, brazzein,
for both low- and high-intensity sweetener markets”).
104 See Hortense W. Dodo et al., Alleviating Peanut Allergy Using Genetic Engineering: The Silencing
of the Immunodominant Allergen Ara h 2 Leads To Its Significant Reduction and a Decrease in Peanut
Allergenicity, 6 PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY J. 135, 140 (2007) (reporting that the study produced “a
significant reduction in the level of Ara h 2, the most immunodominant peanut allergen”); see also
Steven Novella, CRISPR and a Hypoallergenic Peanut, NEUROLOGICA BLOG (Oct. 8, 2015), http://
theness.com/neurologicablog/index.php/crispr-and-a-hypoallergenic-peanut/ [https://perma.cc/RRJ3S9KB] (“In 2005 a study was published showing that it is possible to silence the gene for the Ara
H2 protein, the primary allergenic protein in peanuts. A 2008 follow up by the same team showed
decreased allergenicity of the altered peanut.”).
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as inexpensive vaccines; for example, Applied Biotechnology Institute has
developed a hepatitis B vaccine in maize.105 It remains possible, of course,
that techniques will be developed to produce the relevant benefits with
greatly reduced reliance on GMOs, especially in wealthy nations.
3. Health
With respect to safety, the consensus of the scientific community seems
unambiguous: GM foods do not present health risks.106 In 2012, the American
Association for the Advancement of Science summarized the consensus,
writing that “[t]he World Health Organization, the American Medical
Association, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the British Royal
Society, and every other respected organization that has examined the
evidence has come to the same conclusion: consuming foods containing
ingredients derived from GM crops is no riskier than consuming the same

105 See Celine A. Hayden et al., Oral Delivery of Wafers Made from HBsAg-expressing Maize Germ
Induces Long-term Immunological Systemic and Mucosal Responses, 33 VACCINE 2881, 2885 (2015) (reporting
that “evidence for long-term efficacy . . . [and] safety of of oral administration of the wafers”); see also
Celine A. Hayden et al., Production of Highly Concentrated, Heat-Stable Hepatitis B Surface Antigen in
Maize, PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY J. 979, 984 (2012) (reporting the results of further studies); Celine
A. Hayden et al., Bioencapsulation of the Hepatitis B Surface Antigen and Its Use as an Effective Oral
Immunogen, 30 VACCINE 2937, 2940-42 (2012) (same).
106 See Fred H. Degnan, Biotechnology and the Food Label, in LABELING GENETICALLY
MODIFIED FOOD, supra note 6, at 17, 17 (discussing “the FDA’s science-backed conclusion that, as
a general rule, there is nothing inherently unsafe or mysterious about food biotechnology”). For a
more recent overview, see U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: VOLUNTARY
LABELING INDICATING WHETHER FOODS HAVE OR HAVE NOT BEEN DERIVED FROM
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED PLANTS (Nov. 2015), http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation
/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/LabelingNutrition/ucm059098.htm [https://perma.cc
/YY79-H86J] [hereinafter VOLUNTARY GMO LABELING GUIDANCE], stating,

In the 1992 Policy, FDA stated that it was not aware of any information showing that
bioengineered foods differ from other foods in any meaningful or uniform way, or
that, as a class, foods developed by the new techniques present any different or greater
safety concern than foods developed by traditional plant breeding . . . . Further, FDA
concluded that the method of development of a new plant variety (including the use
of new techniques such as rDNA technology) is generally not material information
within the meaning of section 201(n) of the FD&C Act, and would not usually be
required to be disclosed in the labeling for the food. This determination was reviewed
and upheld by the court in Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 178–
79 (D.D.C. 2000) (finding that FDA’s determination that genetic engineering, alone,
is not a material fact that warrants food labeling was entitled to deference)
. . . . Labeling provided by manufacturers on a wholly voluntary basis regarding
whether a food was or was not bioengineered as described in this guidance is
acceptable to FDA, provided that such labeling is truthful and not misleading. Some
consumers are interested in the information provided in such labeling.
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foods containing ingredients from crop plants modified by conventional plant
improvement techniques.”107
In 2016, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
issued a book-length report,108 strongly reaffirming what American and
European scientists have long found: food from GM crops is no more
dangerous to eat than food produced by conventional agriculture.109 In the
words of the report, there is “no substantiated evidence” that genetic
modification of crops produces less safe foods.110 In the United States, Canada,
the United Kingdom, and Western Europe, “no differences have been found
that implicate a higher risk to human health safety” from genetically
engineered foods.111 In its summary, the report states,
On the basis of its detailed examination of comparisons between currently
commercialized GE and non-GE foods in compositional analysis, acute and
chronic animal toxicity tests, long-term data on health of livestock fed GE
foods, and epidemiological data, the committee concluded that no differences
have been found that implicate a higher risk to human health safety from
these GE foods than from their non-GE counterparts.112

This conclusion tracks that of many others. In 2015, the American
Association for the Advancement of Science spoke unequivocally. In its
words, “The science is quite clear: crop improvement by the modern
molecular techniques of biotechnology is safe.”113 The European Commission
has similarly proclaimed,
The main conclusion to be drawn from the efforts of more than 130 research
projects, covering a period of more than 25 years of research and involving
more than 500 independent research groups, is that biotechnology, and in
107 AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., STATEMENT BY THE AAAS BOARD OF
DIRECTORS ON LABELING OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (2012), http://www.aaas.org/sites
/default/files/AAAS_GM_statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7E4-NBDE]; see also id. (“[T]he science
is quite clear: crop improvement by the modern molecular techniques of biotechnology is safe.”).
108 See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, & MED., GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS:
EXPERIENCES AND PROSPECTS 10 (2016) [hereinafter GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS REPORT].
109 See id.
110 Id. at xvii.
111 Id. at 10; see also Labeling of Foods Derived from Genetically Engineered Plants, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/GEPlants/ucm346858.htm
[https://perma.cc/B4RC-LP7R] (last updated Jan. 18, 2017) (“[T]he agency is not aware of any
information showing that foods derived from genetically engineered plants, as a class, differ from
other foods in any meaningful or uniform way. These foods also don’t present different or greater
safety concerns than their non-genetically engineered counterparts.”).
112 GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS REPORT, supra note 108, at 10.
113 Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of Sci., Statement by the AAAS Board of Directors on
Labeling of Genetically Modified Foods (Oct. 20, 2012), http://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/AAAS
_GM_statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FFK-7QQG].
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particular GMOs, are not per se more risky than e.g. conventional plant
breeding technologies.114

The World Health Organization, the National Academy of Sciences, and
the Royal Society in the United Kingdom are in agreement.
4. Ecology and the Environment
There would also be an argument for labeling if GMOs created ecological
risks, rather than dangers to human health. Here the answer is far less
unambiguous. The 2016 report of the National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine finds no clear evidence that GM crops cause
environmental harm.115 At the same time, the report is written with
considerable caution.116 It does acknowledge the importance of continuing
monitoring, but pointedly declines to embrace the widespread view that those
crops have been responsible for declines in monarch butterfly populations.117
Other studies are less equivocal, finding no special risks to the environment
from GM agriculture. The American Medical Association has endorsed this
general view.118
It must be acknowledged that in some circles, the prevailing scientific
judgments are intensely disputed.119 Some people believe that with respect to
both health and the environment, the scientific consensus is influenced by
114 Ioannis Economidis et al., A Decade of EU-Funded GMO Research (2001-2010), in EUROPEAN
COMM’N, A DECADE OF EU-FUNDED GMO RESEARCH (2001-2010) 15, 16 (2010), https://ec.europa.eu/
research/biosociety/pdf/a_decade_of_eu-funded_gmo_research.pdf [https://perma.cc/RL8J-AAFK].
115 See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS: EXPERIENCES AND
PROSPECTS 8 (2016), https://agbiotech.ces.ncsu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/NAS-GeneticallyEngineered-Crops-Summary.pdf?fwd=no [https://perma.cc/3Q6U-LCM8] (“Overall, the committee found
no conclusive evidence of cause-and-effect relationships between GE crops and environmental problems.”).
116 See id. (“However, the complex nature of assessing long-term environmental changes often
made it difficult to reach definitive conclusions.”).
117 See id. (stating that studies of of monarch populations “have not shown that suppression of
milkweed by glyphosate is the cause of monarch decline”).
118 See COUNCIL ON SCI. & PUB. HEALTH, LABELING OF BIOENGINEERED FOODS 2 (2012)
(“Bioengineered foods have been consumed for close to 20 years, and during that time, no overt
consequences on human health have been reported and/or substantiated in the peer-reviewed literature.”).
119 For example, a collaborative study of statisticians, philosophers, and physicists noted,

[GMOs] are categorically and statistically different from [evolutionary modifications
to ecological systems]. . . . [Those systems] enabl[e] the push and pull of the ecosystem
to locally extinguish harmful mutations. [GMOs] bypass this evolutionary pathway
[and] unintentionally manipulate large sets of inter-dependent factors at the same
time, with dramatic risks of unintended consequences . . . . They thus . . . place a huge
risk on the food system as a whole.
Nassim Nicholas Taleb et al., The Precautionary Principle (with Application to the Genetic Modification
of Organisms) 10 (Extreme Risk Initiative—NYU Sch. of Eng’g Working Paper Series, 2014), http://
www.fooledbyrandomness.com/pp2.pdf [https://perma.cc/66NY-972V].
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powerful private interest groups, which have an interest in denying both
health and environmental concerns.120 In their view, any such consensus is not
trustworthy; they do not necessarily disbelieve that scientists are unconcerned,
but they offer a second-order reason to discount that lack of concern. With
respect to environmental risks in particular, a number of observers point to
what they see as a series of ecological risks, including toxicity to nontarget
organisms (such as butterflies and bees), invasiveness in natural settings, and
threats to biodiversity.121 Some scientists and regulators have also expressed
grave concern that if they are widespread, GMOs will lead to resistance and
the loss of a “public good”—susceptibility of insect pests to certain proteins.122
It should be acknowledged that some people fear long-term effects, not only
ecological in nature, but also cultural and distributional, including the effects
of GM products on small farmers. It is hardly impossible that over time, their
concerns will be vindicated. For present purposes, the central point is that the
prevailing scientific judgment appears to be that the health risks are
nonexistent and that the standard environmental concerns are highly
conjectural and have not been demonstrated to be serious.
5. Risk–Risk Tradeoffs
It should be clear in this light that if GM labels are effective in changing
consumer behavior, there could well be a risk–risk tradeoff. On one view, such
labels might help diminish ecological risks. At the same time, they might
increase risks to health and to the environment. Longer shelf lives save
120 See, e.g., Tim Schwab, Pro-GMO Database: Monsanto Is the Most Common Funder of GMO Research,
FOOD & WATER WATCH (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/insight/pro-gmo-database
-monsanto-most-common-funder-gmo-research [https://perma.cc/EV6K-FR7Q] (“The fact that authors
[of scientific research showing GMOs are safe] are not disclosing all sources of funding (and conflicts
of interest) presents an obvious avenue for biased research to enter the scientific discourse.”).
121 See, e.g., Emily Glass, The Environmental Impact of GMOs, ONE GREEN PLANET (Aug. 2,
2013), http://www.onegreenplanet.org/animalsandnature/the-environmental-impact-of-gmos/ [https://
perma.cc/K23Z-Y7YD] (“GMOs may be toxic to non-target organisms, [including] bees and butterflies
. . . . [T]here is potential for GMO’s . . . to become invasive species in delicate, natural ecosystems. . . .
[B]iodiversity . . . is put at risk by GMOS.”). For a good overview of the science on GMOs and the
environment, see MCHUGHEN, supra note 7, at 137-59. For a deeper look into the risks posed by
GMOs to biodiversity, see WORLD CONSERVATION UNION, CURRENT KNOWLEDGE OF THE
IMPACTS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS ON BIODIVERSITY AND HUMAN HEALTH
22-31 (2007), https://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/ip_gmo_09_2007_1_.pdf [https://perma.cc/YH5P
-UEJP], which discusses habitat change, pollution, invasive alien species, and risk management; and
Heather Landry, Challenging Evolution: How GMOs Can Influence Genetic Diversity, HARV. U.: SCI. NEWS
(Aug. 10, 2015), http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2015/challenging-evolution-how-gmos-can-influencegenetic-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/6J5R-WV7N], which notes, “Although there is little evidence that
GMOs have impacted genetic diversity in today’s environment, scientists and ecologists are very
aware of the potential influence that GMOs have on biodiversity.”
122 See Sarah L. Bates et al., Insect Resistance Management in GM Crops: Past, Present and Future,
23 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 57, 58 (2005) (discussing mandated monitoring of GMO resistance).
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resources, and GM food reduces use of pesticides, which create hazards of their
own.123 The point is not to reach a final judgment about the magnitude of these
effects, but to signal the fact that risks are not only on one side of the equation.
B. What People Want, and Why
1. Labels for Health?
The public opinion evidence is at least as clear as the science: people do not
believe that GM food is safe, and they strongly favor mandatory labels. It is
not easy to find a domain in which public opinion is so unambiguously at odds
with the scientific consensus. A typical survey finds that only 37% of Americans
believe that GM food is safe to eat (as compared with 88% of members of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science).124 According to my
own recent survey, 86% of Americans favor labeling of GM food—89% of
Democrats, 80% of Republicans, and 87% of independents.125
What explains such high levels of support for mandatory labels? The
simplest answer is that people favor labels because they think that GM food
is harmful, and they believe that consumers should be allowed to make an
informed choice about whether to consume it.126 To that extent, the judgment
in favor of labels for GM food is quite similar to the corresponding judgment
with respect to products that contain high levels of salt or that otherwise are
taken to create health risks.127 Without carefully engaging with questions
about costs and benefits, people make an intuitive judgment that government
should mandate labels in order to allow consumers to avoid, if they wish,
products that might be dangerous.

123 See WORLD CONSERVATION UNION, supra note 121, at 7 (“Proponents for GM claim . . .
production can be enhanced while indirectly reducing environmental impacts, for example, through
less use of pesticides or fertilizers.”).
124 Scott et al., Evidence for Absolute Moral Opposition to Genetically Modified Food in the United
States, 11 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 316, 317 (2016).
125 See Sunstein, supra note 17, at 12 tbl.3.
126 See Why Label It?, JUST LABEL IT, http://www.justlabelit.org/right-to-know-center/rightto-know/ [http://perma.cc/44BA-M3CP] (“While our reasons for wanting to know what’s in our food
may vary, what unifies us is the belief that it’s our right.”).
127 See Sunstein, supra note 17, at 189 (finding “strong majority support (73 percent) for a
mandatory warning label on products that have unusually high levels of salt”). Similar findings have
been made in Europe. See Lucia A. Reisch & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Europeans Like Nudges?, 11
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 310, 316 fig.2 (2016) (showing 69-90% support for government
mandated labels of foods containing high levels of salt across different European countries).
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2. Disgust and Naturalness
On the basis of existing research, the simplest answer appears to be
correct, but Sydney Scott, Paul Rozin, and Yoel Inbar offer some important
and illuminating complications.128 Scott et al. asked a representative sample of
Americans whether they supported or opposed genetically engineering plants
and animals.129 The authors also asked respondents to register agreement or
disagreement with the statement, “This should be prohibited no matter how
great the benefits and minor the risks from allowing it.”130
Consistent with previous studies, 64% of participants opposed genetic
engineering.131 In fact, 71% of the opponents—46% of the entire sample—were
absolutists: they want to ban genetic engineering regardless of the benefits and
risks.132 To that extent, their opposition to GM foods is not consequentialist or
based on an assessment of costs and benefits at all. To explain the psychology
behind that apparently puzzling finding, Scott and her coauthors presented
their participants with a scenario in which a random person ends up eating GM
tomatoes (either knowingly or unknowingly).133 They asked people how angry
or disgusted they were when imagining the scenario.134 Opponents of genetic
modification were angrier and more disgusted than its supporters,135 but the
absolutists were especially disgusted.136 Controlling for demographic and other
differences, Scott et al. found that “[d]isgust was the best predictor” of whether
people would proclaim absolute opposition to genetic modification.137
The authors’ conclusion is simple: People who most strongly oppose
genetic modification are not weighing consequences.138 Their opposition is a
product of the fact that they find the idea disgusting.139
That claim requires its own exploration. By itself, the idea of GM food
does not seem to be the sort that would trigger disgust; it is not as if we are
speaking of bodily fluids or the ordinary sources of something like nausea.140
128 See Scott et al., supra note 124, at 316-17 (studying “the roles of disgust and moral absolutism
in Americans’ attitudes toward genetically modified food”).
129 See id. at 17 (describing the questions posed to participants).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 See id. at 317-18 (describing the “tomato scenarios”).
134 Id. at 317.
135 See id. at 318 (reporting higher levels of disgust and anger among GMO opponents).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 See id. at 317 (noting that most individuals who oppose GM foods are “moral absolutists”
because they “would maintain their opposition regardless of consequences”).
139 See id. at 320 (“GM opponents, especially absolutist opponents, tend to feel heightened
disgust, both generally and regarding the consumption of genetically modified foods specifically.”).
140 See Paul Rozin & April E. Fallon, A Perspective on Disgust, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. 23, 23 (1987)
(“Like other basic emotions, disgust has a characteristic facial expression . . . , an appropriate action
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In this context, disgust would seem to be a placeholder for some kind of
intense emotion, signaling disapproval. We might speculate that many people
have an immediate, intuitive sense that what is healthy is what is “natural,”141
and that efforts to tamper with nature will inevitably unleash serious risks—
so-called Frankenfoods.142
This speculation raises two puzzles of its own. First, we might question
whether and to what extent people really are absolutists about GM food. It is
one thing to say, in the abstract, that GM foods should be regulated or banned
regardless of the benefits and risks. It is another thing to favor regulation or
prohibition after receiving concrete information about benefits and risks. If,
for example, people are asked to assume that GM food reduces costs by 20%
or promises to save thousands of lives annually, and that it poses no risks to
health or to the environment, would they really favor regulation or
prohibition? Many of those who purport to be absolutists in the abstract or
in response to general questions tend to become more consequentialist, and
more amenable to some form of cost–benefit balancing, when they are
presented with concrete numbers.143
Second, it is not obvious how regulators should respond to regulatory
intuitions of the kind that existing surveys seem to capture. If people are
using a heuristic (“unnatural is unsafe”), and if that heuristic is producing an
error (“GM food is unsafe”), then regulators should correct the error so that
consumers can make informed decisions. But if consumers are simply
disgusted, then they are registering a taste, not an erroneous judgment.
Consider a purer case of disgust: Some people are disgusted by Jello.144 (I
(distancing of the self from an offensive object), a distinctive physiological manifestation (nausea),
and a characteristic feeling state (revulsion).”).
141 See, e.g., DIETER BIRNBACHER, NATURALNESS: IS THE “NATURAL” PREFERABLE TO THE
“ARTIFICIAL”? 23 (David Carus trans., 2014) (noting that “as long as [the source of a risk] is nature,
risks are more readily tolerated than when they come from anthropogenic sources”); JAMES P.
COLLMAN, NATURALLY DANGEROUS: SURPRISING FACTS ABOUT FOOD, HEALTH, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 31 (2001) (noting that Americas are willing to pay more for organic food “because
they believe that such food is safer, healthier, and more friendly to the environment”); Fern (Mai
Mai) Lin, The Impact of Naturalness on Perceived Risk 1 (Spring 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/ackoff/Ackoff2009/Lin2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YK5-XKUY]
(“There are indications, however, that in the Western world, people have begun to associate
naturalness with reduced risk.”).
142 See Michelle Schoffro Cook, Top 20 Frankenfoods to Avoid, CARE2 (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.
care2.com/greenliving/top-20-frankenfoods-to-avoid.html [https://perma.cc/9NJY-Z53D] (listing the top
twenty “foods and food ingredients [to avoid] to make your body GM-free”).
143 See Jonathan Baron & Sarah Leshner, How Serious Are Expressions of Protected Values?, 6 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 183, 192 (2000) (noting that individuals “will accept actions
that violate [their protected values] if the probability or amount of the harm is small relative to the
probability and magnitude of benefit”).
144 See Jell-O, Why Are You So Gross?: A Dear John Letter, HUFFINGTON POST: TASTE (Oct. 1,
2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/04/gross-jello-hate-jiggle_n_3378066.html [https://perma.
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confess that I am among them.) They can decide to avoid Jello. But should
regulators mandate labels in the face of such a taste (“This product contains
Jello”)? Even if no health issues are involved? In such circumstances, there
would not seem to be a compelling argument for mandatory labeling (to say
the least). I will return to these issues shortly.
C. GMO Labels: Normative Considerations
1. Market Failure
With respect to GM food, is there a market failure, behavioral or
otherwise? Consumers can, of course, refuse to purchase GM food—if they
know that that is what it is. And if consumers care, we should see a degree of
market sorting, in which some companies label their foods as not containing
GMOs; some companies acknowledge that their foods contain GMOs; and
some companies are silent.145 In fact, that is exactly what the American market
has observed, with the help of FDA guidance on the matter.146 Where, then,
is the market failure justifying the disclosure mandate? The Department of
Agriculture will be required to give some kind of answer to that question.147
Consistent with the previous discussion, one response points to behavioral
science. Even though some people will infer that food without a “GMO-free”
label does in fact contain GMOs, many will not. Most consumers are not
thinking about GMOs at all when they are purchasing food. And even though
most consumers support GMO labeling in surveys,148 the issue probably lacks
much salience when people are making choices at restaurants or grocery stores.149
An alternative argument for a market failure involves the environmental
consequences, which amount to third-party effects.150 If GM foods pose
cc/4B9L-GFSQ] (“Jell-O is the smelly kid of desserts and the only reason it’s still around is because
kids haven’t yet learned any better.”).
145 See supra Section I.A. (describing the process of market unraveling that leads to voluntary
disclosure of the relevant ingredient by producers).
146 See VOLUNTARY GMO LABELING GUIDANCE, supra note 106 (“Labeling provided by
manufacturers on a wholly voluntary basis regarding whether a food was or was not bioengineered as
described in this guidance is acceptable to FDA, provided that such labeling is truthful and not misleading.”).
147 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
148 See supra text accompanying note 125.
149 But see Wallace E. Huffman et al., Consumer Willingness to Pay for Genetically Modified Food Labels
in a Market with Diverse Information: Evidence from Experimental Auctions, 28 J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE
ECON. 481, 497 (2003) (concluding that “consumers’ willingness to pay for a food product decreases
when the food label indicates the food product is genetically modified”).
150 See Benoit Morel et al., Pesticide Resistance, the Precautionary Principle, and the Regulation of
Bt Corn: Real Option and Rational Option Approaches to Decisionmaking (proposing option theory as an
analytical framework for the precautionary principle and applying that framework to the issue of
commercializing Bt corn), in BATTLING RESISTANCE TO ANTIBIOTICS AND PESTICIDES 184, 184-85,
192-202 (Ramanan Laxminarayan ed., 2003); Justus Wesseler, Resistance Economics of Transgenic Crops
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nontrivial environmental risks, or even if they merely might do so, labeling can
be seen as a legitimate way of reducing the relevant risks. A label based on thirdparty effects would seem unobjectionable in principle, even though, as noted, a
disclosure mandate is not the preferred way to counteract such effects.151
2. Costs and Benefits
Some people argue that they have a “right to know” what they are eating.152
On this view, consumers are entitled to be informed about the ingredients in
their food—salt, sugar, fat, or GMOs. The initial answer to this suggestion is
that there is no freestanding “right” to mandatory labels, simply because
some, or even many, consumers would favor them. Unless there is a market
failure of some kind, the market provides the knowledge to which consumers
have a right.153 We have explored some reasons why there might be a market
failure here.154 The second answer is that even in the face of an actual market
failure, whether consumers have a right to know, in the form of a mandatory
label, depends on the costs and the benefits.155
a. Costs
To assess costs, the USDA must begin by projecting the costs of labeling
itself. The projection is likely to be disputed,156 but it does not present serious
conceptual difficulties; the only issues are ones of fact. As we have also seen,
there are costs as well to consumers who see the label (and are less happy
when they do) and also to consumers who, having seen the label, buy goods
that are either more costly or inferior (the lost consumer surplus).157
Under Uncertainty: A Real Option Approach (discussing pest resistance as an irreversible cost of transgenic
crops), in BATTLING RESISTANCE TO ANTIBIOTICS AND PESTICIDES, supra, at 214, 214-18; see also
Taleb et al., supra note 119, at 9-11 (discussing potential risks of GMOs and exploring reasons to be
precautionary with respect to them).
151 For more information about the idea of “mismatch” between market failure and regulatory tools,
see BREYER, supra note 24, at 195, which explains that “identify[ing] a mismatch . . . involves finding an
area where the regulatory process is particularly likely to cause significant anticompetitive harm.”
152 See, e.g., Why Label It?, supra note 126 (“While our reasons for wanting to know what’s in
our food may vary, what unifies us is the belief that it’s our right.”).
153 See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
154 See supra subsection II.C.1.
155 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. It follows that the welfarist approach of the
“right to know” asks whether mandatory disclosure passes some kind of cost–benefit test. On some of
the complexities with the idea of welfare, see generally ADLER, supra note 65. Some of those complexities
bear on important regulatory problems—as when a regulation that fails cost–benefit analysis has desirable
distributional consequences—but for GM foods, important distributional consequences do not seem to
arise and so can be fairly bracketed.
156 See supra Section I.B. (discussing the difficulties of quantifying the costs and benefits of
labeling requirements).
157 See supra subsection I.B.1.d.
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The latter costs will be extremely difficult to specify, and the USDA might
be forced to produce some upper or lower bound, or even to say that those
costs are not quantifiable. It might also be reasonable for the USDA to
conclude that those costs are unlikely to be large. Merely seeing the label
would not impose high costs on consumers.158 To project the lost consumer
surplus, agencies would need to project the likely effect of the label on
consumer behavior and the monetized loss. Undertaking that projection
might well turn out to be daunting, even impossible, and the agency might
be unable to produce specific numbers or even a reasonably bounded range.
b. Millions of Labels, in Search of Benefits
If we focus, as agencies frequently do, on health benefits from mandatory
labels, GM labels would seem to be difficult to defend. As we have seen, the
health benefits appear to be zero,159 and so they are not sufficient to justify
even modest costs. We have also seen that, on one view, environmental
benefits cannot be ruled out, but on the basis of the existing science, they are
probably impossible to quantify.160 I will return to that issue; for the moment,
the simple conclusion is that it would not be so easy to argue that the
environmental benefits of labels would justify a significant expenditure.161
In this respect, agencies would have a difficult challenge using their
conventional approach to benefit estimates to justify the conclusion that
mandatory labeling would survive a cost–benefit test, as required by Executive
Orders 12866 and 13563.162 As compared to the case of calorie labeling, for
example, it would be hard to specify health or environmental endpoints, or even
ranges, that could make their way into a conventional regulatory impact analysis.
c. Options
Confronted with this problem, the USDA has several options. First, it
might simply announce that the benefits of GM labels are not quantifiable.
As we have seen, agencies have taken that route in the past, and it has survived

See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
See supra subsection II.A.3.
See supra subsection II.A.4.
But see Taleb et al., supra note 119, at 9-11 (arguing that GMOs pose risks that are worth
taking quite seriously).
162 See supra notes 1–2 and 11. Of course, the existing requirements apply only “to the extent
permitted by law,” meaning that, under a mandatory labeling law, agencies would be required to proceed
even if the benefits did not justify the costs. See supra note 15. Nonetheless, it is awkward for an agency
to announce that it is proceeding in the face of costs that greatly exceed benefits—though it has
happened. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 71, at 201 n.27 (2014) (noting that it is “exceedingly rare . . . for an
agency to proceed when the monetized costs exceed the monetized benefits”).
158
159
160
161
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judicial scrutiny, at least under statutes that require agencies to act.163 The
problem with this approach is that when agencies have previously imposed
disclosure mandates without quantifying benefits, they could usually say that
they expect significant benefits (in terms of money or health), but could only
speculate about their magnitude.164 If the expectation of significant benefits
is reasonable, a failure to quantify may not be objectionable, at least if
quantification is not feasible.
In this context, by contrast, the problem is that there would seem to be
no benefits at all (bracketing the question of environmental harm, to which I
will return). When benefits are in the general range of zero, it is not enough,
or even reasonable, to say that they are speculative. Because the statute
requires the USDA to act,165 the inability to project benefits is unlikely to be
objectionable purely as a matter of law, but it does require serious challenges
for the agency when it attempts to produce a regulatory impact analysis and
to survive scrutiny within the executive branch.
The closest analogy may well be the conflict minerals controversy, where
the SEC was not able to project benefits and candidly confessed to that fact.166
Because GM labels are required by law, such a confession would likely be
enough to survive judicial review, but it would encounter hard questions under
the process of OIRA review.
Faced with that problem, the USDA might engage in some form of
breakeven analysis, especially if the costs of mandatory GM labels can be
described as low.167 We can easily imagine creative efforts in this vein, asking
(for example) about whether it would be worthwhile to charge the average
American $X annually (where $X is very little) in return for GM labels.168
Suppose, for example, that the cost of a label is $2.30 per person per year.169
163 See supra note 47.
164 Id.
165 See supra note 10.
166 See supra note 47.
167 For one estimate, see JOHN DUNHAM, COST IMPACT OF VERMONT’S GMO LABELING
LAW ON CONSUMERS NATIONWIDE 2 (2016), http://corn.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Cost-Impact

-of-Vermont’s-GMO-Labeling-Law-on-Consumers-Nationwide.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NBC-4MVV],
which “conclude[d] that the one-time cost to consumers as a result of the [Vermont GMO] labeling
requirement w[ould] be as high as $3.8 billion.”
168 The Department of Justice used a similar approach to justify renovations in the context of
building accessibility. See Sunstein, supra note 48, at 1401-02 (describing the Department’s method of using
a breakeven analysis to frame $32.6 million in costs to replace bathroom doors as only $0.05-$2.20 per use).
169 See Memorandum from Andrew Dyke & Robert Whelan, ECONorthwest, to Consumers
Union 1 (Sept. 12, 2014), https://consumersunion.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/GMO_labeling
_cost_findings_Exe_Summ.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZLS-YAQA] (finding that the median estimated
cost of mandatory labeling is $2.30 per person per year). With the flexibility of the national law
permitting compliance with the use of bar codes, see supra note 5, the costs should be significantly
lower than they would otherwise be. However, the $2.30 figure, produced by an interested party,
might not be credible.
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It might well be suggested that the mandate obviously survives breakeven
analysis. Isn’t that modest cost worth incurring, given widespread consumer
preference for labels and good-faith concerns about ecological risks? Perhaps so. But
one problem is that on the assumption about the per person cost, the
aggregate cost is over $700 million—hardly a trivial amount.170 It would be
easy, and misleading, to say that any annual $700 million expenditure is
justified because, for all Americans, the annual per person cost is merely $2.30.
The real question is what people are obtaining for that $700 million.
As an independent method of valuation, or as part of some breakeven
analysis, it might seem reasonable to put a spotlight on consumers’ willingness-topay for GM labels. On the basis of survey evidence suggesting that consumers
favor such labels, 171 it would not be implausible to think that the amount would
be significant population-wide—and per person, at least $2.30 per year. Ideally,
regulators would have some evidence of people’s willingness-to-pay, which they
could compare with some estimate of costs. In the absence of such evidence,
they might nonetheless engage in breakeven analysis.
Would an approach of that kind be sufficient to ground a reasonable cost–
benefit analysis under prevailing executive orders? At first glance, it should be,
but as we shall now see, any approach of that kind turns out to raise some
quite fundamental questions about regulatory policy.
d. What Consumers Want
We can easily imagine cases in which the law should not mandate labels
even if consumers would be willing to pay for them. Suppose, for example,
that consumers want to know whether African-Americans or Jews were
involved in the production of some commodity. To the extent that the
consumer demand reflected racism or prejudice, it should not be honored.
But the call for GM labels does not run afoul of this principle, because no
invidious discrimination is involved.
Consider a more relevant comparison: Suppose that consumers are
alarmed about some ingredient in food—call it Omega P—even though there
is no reason for alarm. Suppose that there is an online health scare about
Omega P and that people at least want to know whether the food they are
eating contains it. In principle, a label is not a good idea. It would cater to
public ignorance, and it would have no benefits. For government, the right
response is to inform people that Omega P is, in fact, safe. Note that in this
case, the standard argument for use of willingness-to-pay is decisively
undermined. People might be willing to pay something—perhaps even a great
170 This figure was obtained by multiplying a rounded estimate of the population of the United
States by the $2.30 estimate.
171 See supra text accompanying note 125.
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deal—for Omega P labels, but because such labels would not promote their
welfare, there is no sufficient reason to mandate them. Note in this regard
that 80% of Americans have been found to favor a label for foods that contain
DNA (!).172 The challenge for the USDA will be to show that labels for GM
food are relevantly different from labels for Omega P; perhaps uncertainty
and irreversibility can help the agency to show relevant distinctions.173
3. But Morality?
For some people, arguments about health and the environment miss the
central points. On one view, the objection to GM foods is theological: GMOs
tamper with God’s creation.174 On another view, it is moral: there is something
wrong with treating nature in this way.175 On a third view, GM food benefits
large corporations and the wealthy at the expense of small farmers, poor
nations, and the poor in general.176 The third view can easily be translated
into an argument about adverse effects on third parties. Under all three views,
GM labels are a modest step in the right direction insofar as they allow
consumers to know what they are buying and to register their preferences, their
values, and their commitments.
At the very least, we should be willing to agree that if labels do have some
kind of moral motivation, they might be well-justified, even if quantitative
cost–benefit analysis turns out to be challenging, impossible, or beside the
point.177 We have seen analogies, in the form of labels designed to prevent
cruelty to animals. Could GM labels be defended on some similar grounds?
It should not be sufficient merely to point to the fact of moral concern; the
question is whether the moral concern has some plausible basis. In the

172 See JAYSON LUSK & SUSAN MURRAY, OKLA. ST. U., FOOD DEMAND SURVEY 4 (2015),
http://agecon.okstate.edu/faculty/publications/4975.pdf [https://perma.cc/HUF3-BXAQ] (reporting
that 80% of survey respondents support mandatory labeling of foods that contain DNA).
173 See supra note 150.
174 See, e.g., Gena, Comment to Why Did Chobani Change Its Mind on GMOs?, FARMER’S
DAUGHTER USA (Oct. 16, 2015, 7:28 PM), http://www.thefarmersdaughterusa.com/2014/10/why-didchobani-change-its-mind-on-gmos.html [https://perma.cc/NV9V-BSPN] (“HE is always watching and
HE will not take kindly to the adulteration of the food HE blessed upon us with.”).
175 See Amy Harmon, A Lonely Quest for Facts on Genetically Modified Crops, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
4, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/us/on-hawaii-a-lonely-quest-for-facts-about-gmos.html
[https://perma.cc/759E-4DCM] (reporting that one proponent of a bill banning GMO crops from
being grown in Hawaii “took the microphone ‘on behalf of Mother Earth and all sentient beings’”).
176 See Opinion, Genetically Modified Food and the Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2003), http://www.
nytimes.com/2003/10/13/opinion/genetically-modified-food-and-the-poor.html [https://perma.cc/B8WK929R] (noting that the “[GMO] industry is tightly controlled by five conglomerates” and that “the real
problem is that genetic engineering is hurting the poor”).
177 See supra text accompanying note 4; see also Posner & Sunstein, supra note 27, at 4.
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abstract, an affirmative answer can hardly be ruled out; many people hold
moral concerns about GM food in good faith.178
The difficulty is to specify some intelligible moral principle that does in
fact call for labels. It is not at all clear that there is a plausible religious
objection to GM foods (and if there were, it could not easily be invoked by the
Department of Agriculture without raising First Amendment issues). It is hard
to make sense of the argument that GM foods are “mistreating nature.”179 Nor
is it clear that GM labels can be plausibly defended on distributional grounds
in light of the considerable difficulty in demonstrating that GM foods are
objectionable on such grounds and in showing that even if they are, labels are
helpful in meeting that challenge.180 But I do not mean to reach a judgment on
the particulars here—only to suggest the form of a possible justification and
the serious challenges that the USDA, or anyone else, might face in offering it.
4. Drawing False Inferences
There is an additional concern: the signal contained in the mandatory
label might affirmatively mislead consumers.181 If the government requires
Omega P labels, many consumers will infer that public officials are worried
about Omega P and believe that consumers should think carefully before
consuming food that contains it. Whatever the government is seeking to
convey, the disclosure might well contain this signal: “Omega P is a legitimate
cause for concern.” To the extent that public officials provide such a signal,
they are affirmatively misleading people. Whether the mandate is heard to
offer that signal is, of course, an empirical question.
The FDA is plainly concerned with the risk that consumers might be
misled in this context. In 2015, it noted that
a statement may be false or misleading if, when considered in the context of
the entire label or labeling . . . it suggests or implies that a food product or
See supra text accompanying note 124.
See MCHUGHEN, supra note 7, at 143 (discussing the moral and ethical concerns some
people have regarding GMOs).
180 See id. at 143-44, 213 (discussing socioeconomic concerns related to GMOs and the limitations
of mandatory labels to remedy those concerns). One possible defense would point to consumers’
willingness-to-pay for labels to promote distributional concerns. But as before, the question remains
whether that fact is sufficient, independent of its basis. Recall also that a distributional argument rests
on its own; it need not be defended in terms of consumers’ willingness-to-pay. See supra note 53.
181 See supra note 14; see also Colin A. Carter & Guillaume P. Gruère, Mandatory Labeling of
Genetically Modified Foods: Does It Really Provide Consumer Choice?, 6 J. AGROBIOTECHNOLOGY MGMT.
& ECON. 68, 70 (2003) (“Mandatory labeling provides food processors and retailers a choice, but it
does not facilitate consumer choice. Because of rational food processor decisions, mandatory labeling
acts as a market barrier, and GM products do not appear at the retail level.”); cf. Charles Noussair et
al., Do Consumers Really Refuse to Buy Genetically Modified Food?, 114 ECON. J. 102, 113 (2004) (conducting
an experiment and finding “that the ‘average’ consumer values the absence of GMOs”).
178
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ingredient is safer, more nutritious, or otherwise has different attributes than
other comparable foods because the food was not genetically engineered. For
example, the labeling of a bag of specific type of frozen vegetables that states
that they were “not produced through modern biotechnology” could be
misleading if, in addition to this statement, the labeling contains statements
or vignettes that suggest or imply that, as a result of not being produced
through modern biotechnology, such vegetables are safer, more nutritious, or
have different attributes than other foods solely because the food was not
produced using modern biotechnology.182

Some evidence suggests that consumers would indeed draw an inference,
from a label, that the government believes that GM food is unhealthy.183 In
one study, “respondents consistently believed that foods labeled GMO are
less healthy, safe and environmentally-friendly compared to all other labels,”
suggesting that “a disconnect [may exist] between respondent attitudes
[toward the label] and the scientific consensus” on GM food.184 Nor is it
irrational for consumers to infer, from a label, that public officials believe that
GM foods pose some kind of risk. Ordinarily, labels are required for that
reason; they are essentially warnings and taken as such.
In the implementation of the new GM labeling law, we could imagine
creative responses by the private or public sector. The government might
allow or require the warnings to be accompanied by a disclaimer: “The FDA
has determined that GM foods do not pose a health risk of any kind.” Or more
gently: “The FDA has not determined that GM foods pose a health risk of any
kind.” Producers of GM foods might be allowed or encouraged to embark on
an educational campaign offering exactly that message. For fully rational
consumers, clarifying steps of this kind should correct any misimpression.
But for many consumers, such steps might not work. On the contrary,
they might even backfire. In view of public opposition to GM foods, a
statement to the effect that GM foods “do not carry a health risk” might
instead focus public attention on the possible association between GM foods
and the whole idea of health risks. Many consumers might think, “Where
there is smoke, there is fire; why not buy something else?” Of course, the
existence and extent of this reaction present empirical questions, but existing
evidence suggests that many consumers will make a false inference and that
it will not be easy to correct that inference.
VOLUNTARY GMO LABELING GUIDANCE, supra note 106, at 7.
See Bar-Gill et al., supra note 14, at 21 (reporting that survey respondents believed GMO
disclosure was the product of research finding GM food to be harmful); Joanna K. Sax & Neal
Doran, Food Labeling and Consumer Associations with Health, Safety and Environment, 44 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 630, 631 (2016) (discussing consumer perceptions of mandatory food labels).
184 Id. at 636.
182
183
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If labels mislead (some or many) people, the issue is not at an end. It is
necessary to ask what kind of welfare loss that imposes. A key question is
whether consumers will end up purchasing GMO-free food that is inferior
along some dimension—say, it is more expensive or less nutritious. If they do
so, that is a welfare loss, and it may be substantial.
5. A Summary
I have covered numerous issues here, and a summary may be useful. With
respect to costs, the USDA must calculate the expense of producing the labels
themselves. The calculation will undoubtedly produce some dispute, but the
analysis should be reasonably straightforward. There are costs to consumers
who see the label (and are less happy when they do) and also to consumers
who, having seen the label, buy goods that are more costly or (in their view)
inferior. The latter costs are more important but will be extremely difficult to
specify; the USDA might do best simply to say that they are not quantifiable.
It might be reasonable for the agency to conclude that the costs are unlikely
to be large, though informed conjecture or (better) evidence would of course
be necessary to support that conclusion.
The benefits issue is far more challenging. It is not possible to identify
health endpoints that would justify mandatory labels. Nor is it simple to
specify environmental risks or to connect a disclosure mandate to reduction
of those risks. In principle, the willingness-to-pay figure is the right one, but
it is highly doubtful that the USDA could produce reliable estimates. Even if
it did, the numbers might well be a product of consumer errors in the form
of a mistaken belief that GM foods produce health risks.
In these circumstances, the USDA will not have an easy time in
demonstrating that the benefits of mandatory labels justify the costs. As I
have noted, the law requires the agency to proceed even if it cannot make that
demonstration, but under prevailing executive orders, no agency likes to
proceed when costs plainly exceed benefits, and the process of scrutiny within
the executive branch will produce a serious demand for some kind of plausible
cost–benefit justification. For the USDA, the best option is probably to offer
a breakeven analysis, invoking consumers’ wishes, the risk of irreversible
environmental harm (perhaps with special attention to biodiversity185), or
both. If the per person cost of labels is indeed very low, a breakeven analysis
might turn out to be plausible. That claim brings us to our final topic.

185

See MCHUGHEN, supra note 7, at 137-59 (discussing the science on GMOs and the environment).
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III. PRECAUTIONS, IRREVERSIBILITY, AND UNCERTAINTY
When a product or activity creates some kind of risk, even a small one,
many people argue in favor of precautions, and, in particular, in favor of the
precautionary principle.186 Some of the central claims on behalf of that
principle involve uncertainty, learning over time, irreversibility, and the need
for epistemic humility on the part of scientists. Any consensus might turn out
to be wrong; today’s assurance might be tomorrow’s red alert.187 In particular,
GMOs are often thought to trigger the precautionary principle, with special
emphasis on the need for continued monitoring, residual uncertainty, and
potentially irreversible188 or catastrophic environmental risks.189 This is no
mere theoretical point. As one commentator explains, European “legislation
that governed GMOs used a precautionary approach, and precaution was one
basis for the de facto moratorium on authorizations of GM varieties.”190
A. Worst Cases
Whatever we think about the particular application, the precautionary
principle has deep roots in international law.191 As long ago as 1982, for
example, the United Nations World Charter for Nature gave international
186 For general discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1003 (2003).
187 See generally THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE 20TH CENTURY: LATE LESSONS
FROM EARLY WARNINGS (Poul Harremoës et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE] (providing an overview of the precautionary principle and its application to real world
problems, including DDT, GMOs, and global warming).
188 See Morel et al., supra note 150, at 184-85, 192-202 (proposing option theory as an analytical
framework for the precautionary principle and applying that framework to the issue of commercializing
Bt corn); Wesseler, supra note 150, at 215-18 (discussing pest resistance as an irreversible cost of
transgenic crops). For information about irreversibility more broadly, see Kenneth J. Arrow & Anthony
C. Fischer, Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty and Irreversibility, 88 Q.J. ECON. 312, 313-14 (1974),
which discusses the costs of irreversible harm to the environment; Scott Farrow, Using Risk
Assessment, Benefit-Cost Analysis, and Real Options to Implement a Precautionary Principle, 24 RISK
ANALYSIS 727, 728 (2004), which applies real-options analysis to public policy and the precautionary
principle; and Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversibility, 9 LAW, PROBABILITY, & RISK 227, 227 (2010), which
discusses irreversibility as an element of social problems.
189 See Grossman, supra note 6, at 35-36 (noting that early European legislation was triggered
by the perceived risk of GMOs as biotechnologies that posed risks to the environment); see also
Anthony C. Fisher, Uncertainty, Irreversibility, and the Timing of Climate Policy 9 (Oct. 2001),
http://stephenschneider.stanford.edu/Publications/PDF_Papers/timingFfisher.pdf [https://perma.cc
/B49V-L97M] (describing the option value of postponing decisions that could have potentially
irreversible effects on the environment).
190 Grossman, supra note 6, at 36.
191 See Caroline E. Foster, Science and the Precautionary Principle in International Courts and
Tribunals: Expert Evidence, Burden of Proof and Finality 19-20 (2013) (describing the history of
the precautionary principles and its flourishing in international agreements since the early 1980s);
Grossman, supra note 6, at 35 (“The precautionary principle . . . has become part of international
law, particularly in measures that protect the environment”).
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recognition to the principle, suggesting that “where potential adverse effects
are not fully understood, the activities should not proceed.”192 The 1992 Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development asserts, “In order to protect the
environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”193 The widely
publicized Wingspread Declaration, from a meeting of environmentalists in 1998,
goes further still: “When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the
environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause-andeffect relationships are not established scientifically. In this context the proponent
of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof.”194
In its various forms, the precautionary principle has been subject to a
great deal of analysis, some of it quite skeptical195 and some of it highly
supportive.196 A central question involves the appropriate approach to “worstcase” thinking. This is not the place for a full analysis, which would require
investigation of some complex issues in decision theory,197 but three points
seem clear (bracketing hard questions about quantification). First, if a product
or activity has modest or no benefits, the argument for taking precautions is

G.A. Res. 37/7, annex, World Charter for Nature (Oct. 28, 1982).
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1, princ. 15 (June 13, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration],
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 876, 879.
194 See Lessons from Wingspread, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT:
IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, app. A at 353-54 (Carolyn Raffensperger &
Joel A. Tickner eds., 1999) (quoting the Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle).
The Wingspread Declaration was issued by a group of international scientists, government officials,
lawyers, labor activist, and grassroots environmental activists following a meeting at Wingspread in
Racine, Wisconsin to discuss the precautionary principle. See id. at 349.
195 See INDUR M. GOKLANY, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT 7 (2001) (observing that a “one-sided application of the
precautionary principle itself provides no guidance . . . in situations where an action . . . could
simultaneously lead to uncertain benefits and uncertain harms (internal citation omitted)); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 14 (2005) (concluding that
“the Precautionary Principle in its strongest forms is that it is incoherent” because “it purports to
give guidance, but it fails to do so”).
196 See THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 187, at 1 (collecting the “histories of a
selection of hazards” and how the precautionary principle was applied to them to “try[] to reduce
current and future risks”); Nabil I. Al-Najjar, A Bayesian Framework for the Precautionary Principle,
44 J. LEGAL STUD. S337, S361 (2016) (concluding that the precautionary principle is a means of
correcting human and societal biases); see also Foster, supra note 191, at 20 (arguing that the precautionary
principle has allowed “states to take action in response to the early warnings signs of [serious
environmental] threats”).
197 For an especially good discussion of this point, see generally Al-Najjar, supra note 196. Also
valuable is DANIEL STEEL, PHILOSOPHY AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: SCIENCE,
EVIDENCE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (2014).
192
193
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far stronger than if the benefits are significant. Second, if a product or activity
creates a trivially small risk (taking account of both the probability and the
magnitude of a bad outcome), then the product or activity should not be
banned or regulated (including through labels) if it promises significant
benefits. Third: if a product creates a small (but not trivial) risk of catastrophe,
there is a strong argument for banning or regulating it (including through
labels) if the benefits are very modest and so do not justify running that risk.
Some of the most difficult cases arise when (1) a product or activity has
significant benefits and (2) (a) the probability of a bad outcome is difficult or
impossible to specify (creating a situation of “uncertainty,” rather than risk198),
and (b) the bad outcome is catastrophic or (c) the harms associated with the bad
outcome cannot be identified (creating a situation of “ignorance”199). In such
difficult cases, it is not simple to balance the two sides of the ledger, and there
is a real argument for eliminating the worst-case scenario.200
Let us bracket the most complicated questions here and simply note that
in this light, a precautionary argument for labeling GM foods (or otherwise
for regulating them) depends in large part201 on answers to questions of fact.
Is this a difficult case or an easy one? The answer turns largely on two further
questions. Do such foods promise modest benefits, or instead large ones? With

198 See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 19-20 (Midway Reprint ed.,
Univ. of Chi. Press 1985) (1921) (distinguishing measurable uncertainties, or “‘risk’ proper,” from
unknowable uncertainties, called uncertainty); Paul Davidson, Is Probability Theory Relevant for
Uncertainty? A Post Keynesian Perspective, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 129, 129-31 (1991) (describing the difference
between true uncertainty and risk); Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV.
841, 848 (2006) (noting that for risk, “probabilities can be assigned to various outcomes,” while for
uncertainty, “no such probabilities can be assigned”). For a technical treatment of the possible
rationality of maximin, see generally Kenneth J. Arrow & Leonid Hurwicz, An Optimality Criterion for
Decision-Making Under Ignorance, in UNCERTAINTY AND EXPECTATIONS IN ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF G.L.S. SHACKLE 1 (C.F. Carter & J.L. Ford eds., 1972). For a nontechnical overview, see
JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING TECHNICAL CHANGE app. 1 at 185-207 (1983).
199 See THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 187, at 217 tbl.17.1 (defining ignorance as
“‘[u]nknown’ impacts and therefore ‘unknown’ probabilities”).
200 For a discussion of maximin, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 152-57 (1971). For
information about complications in “[a]cting as if the worst will happen,” see ELSTER, supra note 198,
at app. 1. at 203-04. See also Adrian Vermeule, Rationally Arbitrary Decisions in Administrative Law, 44
J. LEGAL STUD. S475, S478 (2015) (“[I]n the face of uncertainty a rational decision maker may set
the α-value—the parameter that captures pessimism or optimism—anywhere within a range defined
by the worst-case and best-case scenarios . . . .”). Relevant discussion can also be found in Martin
L. Weitzman, Fat-Tailed Uncertainty in the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change, 5 REV. ENVTL.
ECON. & POL’Y 275, 276 (2011), which discusses “structural uncertainties in the economics of
extreme climate change.”
201 It also depends partly on concepts. For a discussion on some of the these issues, see
ELSTER, supra note 198, at app. 1; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS 127-28 (2007),
which argues that regulation to avoid worst-case scenarios can sometimes result in “worst-case
scenarios of [their] own”; and Vermeule, supra note 200, at S481, which discusses the “conceptual
mistakes about what counts as rational decision making under uncertainty.”
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respect to harm, are we speaking of risk, uncertainty, or ignorance? The
scientific consensus appears to be risk—and that the underlying danger is very
low.202 The consensus may or may not prove correct, but however important,
its correctness raises no interesting conceptual questions for our purposes. At
the same time, it is true that those who favor a kind of epistemic humility,
even for scientific consensus, will be drawn to a precautionary approach.
It should be added that if GM foods really do create a potentially
catastrophic risk, and if a sensible version of the precautionary principle is
therefore triggered, GM labels are hardly an obvious response. In the
abstract, they seem far too weak and modest. Indeed, GM labels might do no
good at all. The counterargument is that they might be able to diminish the
risk, on certain assumptions about the likely consumer response, and so might
count as one reasonable step. I have raised a question about whether the
science justifies invocation of precautionary thinking here, but if it does,
labeling might be a justified, if partial, response.
A distinctive argument, ventured by Nassim Nicholas Taleb et al., is that
GM crops pose a “ruin” problem, involving a low probability of catastrophically
high costs.203 Taleb et al. contend that for such problems, it is best to take strong
precautions—in this case, placing “severe limits” on GM food.204 The discussion
has some technical features, but let us suppose that it is correct. If so, the
question is whether GM crops really do create ruin problems. Perhaps they do,
but it is certainly possible to read the most recent science to suggest that they
do not, and if the probability of catastrophic harm is vanishingly low
(essentially zero), rather than merely very low, we can fairly ask whether Taleb
et al.’s argument applies.
B. Precautions and Democracy
On one view, the precautionary principle is not only, or even fundamentally,
about irreversibility, catastrophe, and decision theory.205 It has an insistently
democratic foundation. Its goal is to assert popular control over risks that concern
the public.206 It is about values, not facts. If members of the public are concerned
about GMOs, nuclear power, or nanotechnology, then the precautionary

See supra notes 106–21 and accompanying text.
See Taleb et al., supra note 119, at 10 (arguing that by “manipulat[ing] large sets of
interdependent factors at the same time,” GMOs have the potential to upset the entire food system).
204 Id. at 1.
205 See supra note 187.
206 See, e.g., David Gee & Morris Greenberg, Asbestos: From ‘Magic’ to Malevolent Mineral, in
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 187, at 47, 59 (discussing how regulation of asbestos
resulted, in large part, from public pressure for the government to regulate).
202
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principle provides them with a space for them to assert those concerns. It ensures
democratic legitimation of the process of risk regulation.
For those who embrace the precautionary principle on this ground, efforts
to speak of costs and benefits will fall on deaf ears. And for those who believe
that in this domain or others, scientists are in the grip of powerful private
interests, and that the “system is rigged,” a precautionary approach will seem
especially appealing—not least for democratic reasons.207 If the science is
compromised, and hence unreliable, it should hardly be decisive. For those
who believe that popular concerns often turn out to be justified even if
scientists discount them, the democratic justification for the precautionary
principle might even turn out to be appealing on epistemic grounds.
No abstract argument can rule out the possibility that scientists are
mistaken or that they have been compromised. It is correct to emphasize that
a scientific consensus in favor of safety208 can be wrong; the same is the case
for a scientific consensus in favor of danger.209 For those who favor the
precautionary principle on democratic grounds—and believe that popular
concerns about GM foods are a legitimate basis for invocation of the
principle—the arguments offered here cannot be decisive. The only response
is that some form of welfarism, embodied in the executive branch’s selfconscious efforts to cataloge the human consequences of regulation,210 should
not be trumped by baseless fear—and that cost–benefit analysis, understood
as a form of applied welfarism,211 should not be abandoned merely because
people are needlessly worried.
CONCLUSION
My goals in this Article have been twofold. First, I have attempted to
make progress in understanding the distinctive challenges, both conceptual
and empirical, that agencies face in cataloguing the costs and (especially) the
benefits of mandatory labels, and in demonstrating that the benefits of such
207 As one commentator noted in response to an argument against mandatory labels, “So God
is wrong and Monsanto is right?”
208 See supra subsection II.A.3.
209 See ALLAN MAZUR, TRUE WARNINGS AND FALSE ALARMS: EVALUATING FEARS
ABOUT THE HEALTH RISKS OF TECHNOLOGY, 1948–1971, at 4 (2004) (“No scientific judgment is
absolute. Objections or qualifications can be raised for every risk assessment.”).
210 See ADLER, supra note 65, at 165-66 (discussing the perspective that “government should
orient policy around producing individual well-being” while also acknowledging that there exist
different approaches to measuring well-being).
211 See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 12 (2006) (explaining cost–benefit analysis in terms of welfare economics, and stating that
“welfare economics assumes that a person is better off when his preferences are respected”);
SUNSTEIN, supra note 71, at 145-47 (describing cost–benefit analysis in the context of the risk of
human death).
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labels justify the costs. Second, I have tried to show that those challenges are
especially acute in the context of labels for GM foods.
In the abstract, the argument for labeling GM food seems appealing, perhaps
even irresistible. Many people are concerned about what they see as the
associated risks of GM food.212 It might appear obvious that they should have a
right to know what they are eating. Partly in response to these claims, there has
been a growing movement in favor of mandatory labeling; the movement has
now resulted in federal legislation.213 That legislation requires implementing
regulations from the USDA,214 and hence some kind of cost–benefit analysis.215
I have suggested that it will not be easy for the USDA to show that the
benefits of GM labels justify the costs. To the extent that the health risks are
nonexistent,216 and the environmental risks are highly speculative,217 the
benefits might fail to support regulatory action, even if the costs are relatively
low. To be sure, consumers do appear to support labeling, at least in surveys.218
But in their actual behavior, most consumers do not show much evidence that
they care, as reflected in the fact that the countless foods without a “GM free”
label have not exactly been losing market shares.
Moreover, consumer concerns about GM foods appear to be rooted in some
combination of baseless fears of health risks and generalized disgust219—hardly
a sufficient basis for mandatory labels. There is also a risk that GM labels
will, for a significant part of the population, end up producing a misleading
signal, to the effect that the government believes that GM foods impose
significant health risks.220
Some regulatory initiatives are justified as precautions in the face of either
risk or uncertainty. There are good reasons to consider regulation of products
that impose a small risk of imposing irreversible or catastrophic harm, and if the
risk cannot be quantified, it might make sense to eliminate the worst-case
scenarios.221 On one view of the science, precautions are justified against GM
food because of the environmental risks, and those precautions might include
labels (and possibly more). The best response is that the scientific consensus
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See supra notes 6–7.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
See supra note 11.
See supra subsection II.A.3.
See supra subsection II.A.4.
See supra text accompanying note 125.
See supra text accompanying notes 124, 133–39.
See supra text accompanying notes 182–85.
See supra notes 203–05 and accompanying text.
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does not justify that conclusion. If so, the argument for a precautionary approach
is difficult to defend—at least if GM food promises significant benefits.222
In these circumstances, the USDA will face difficulty in demonstrating
that the benefits of implementing regulations justify their costs. To be sure,
the law requires labels,223 and hence the agency’s inability to make such a
demonstration will not prevent implementing regulations from being issued.
But within the executive branch, there will be a substantial effort to explore
costs and benefits, and to show, if at all possible, that the benefits provide a
sufficient justification. The USDA’s best (or least bad) option may be to
emphasize that the costs of labels are quite low and to use breakeven analysis,
either invoking consumers’ desire to have labels or pointing to the existence
of potentially serious or even catastrophic environmental risks that cannot be
ruled out of bounds. If the per person cost is very low—say, $2 per year—then
a breakeven analysis would not be implausible.224
My focus throughout has been on mandatory labels for GM foods, but
my real topic has been far broader. In numerous contexts, Congress requires
or authorizes federal agencies to impose disclosure requirements.225 In all
those contexts, executive agencies are required, by executive order, to cataloge
the benefits and costs of disclosure requirements, and to demonstrate that the
benefits justify the costs.226 As we have seen, agencies face persistent challenges
in projecting benefits, and they use four different approaches, including a
refusal to do so on the ground that quantification is not feasible; breakeven

222 See, e.g., Graham Brookes & Peter Barfoot, GM Crops: The Global Economic and
Environmental Impact—The First Nine Years 1996–2004, 8 AGBIOFORUM 187, 194-95 (2005)
(quantifying the economic and environmental benefits associated with GM technology and finding
“substantial economic benefits at the farm level,” “less pesticide use,” and “a significant contribution
to reducing greenhouse gas emissions”); K.-H. Engel et al., Current and Future Benefits from the Use
of GM Technology in Food Production, 127 TOXICOLOGY LETTERS 329, 330-32 (2002) (listing
beneficial applications of GM technology, including improving plants’ herbicide tolerance, insect
resistance, and nutritional properties); Randall Lutter & Katherine Tucker, Unacknowledged Health
Benefits of Genetically Modified Food: Salmon and Heart Disease Deaths, 5 AGBIOFORUM 59, 59 (2002)
(proposing that “[l]ower production costs [of GM salmon] would lower prices, increase salmon
consumption, and boost intake” of heart-healthy nutrients).
223 See supra text accompanying note 9.
224 See supra text accompanying notes 167–70.
225 For a detailed catalogue and a highly skeptical account, see BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER,
supra note 44.
226 See supra notes 1–2 and 11. Note that current executive orders do not apply to the so-called
“independent” agencies, though those agencies sometimes produce cost–benefit analyses under
statutory compulsion or on their own. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1149-50 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (finding that the SEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in that it “inconsistently and
opportunistically framed the costs and benefits of the rule” and “failed adequately to quantify the
certain costs”). Recall once more that whenever the law requires agencies to proceed, they must do
so even if benefits do not justify costs; the requirements in relevant executive orders are imposed
“to the extent permitted by law.” See supra note 15.
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analysis; projection of end-states, such as economic savings or health outcomes;
and estimates of willingness-to-pay for the relevant information.
Each of these approaches raises serious questions and runs into strong
objections. In principle, the right question involves willingness-to-pay227; but in
practice, agencies face formidable problems in trying to answer that question. If
answers are unavailable, a breakeven analysis is the very least that should be
required, and it is sometimes the most that agencies can do. If it is accompanied
by some account of potential outcomes, acknowledging uncertainties, a
breakeven analysis will often show that mandatory disclosure is justified on
welfare grounds—and often that it is not.

227

This is subject to qualifications. See supra note 53.
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